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by Elizabeth J. Harris
To people looking at Buddhism through the medium of English, the practice of
compassion and detachment can appear incompatible, especially for those who consider
themselves to be socially and politically engaged. In contemporary usage, compassion
brings to mind outward-moving concern for others, while detachment suggests aloofness
and withdrawal from the world. Yet Buddhism recommends both as admirable and necessary
qualities to be cultivated. This raises questions such as the following:
- If compassion means to relieve suffering in a positive way, and detachment
to remain aloof from the world, how can the two be practiced together?
- Does detachment in Buddhism imply lack of concern for humanity?
- Is the concept of compassion in Buddhism too passive, connected only with
the inward-looking eye of meditation, or can it create real change in society?
It is certainly possible to draw sentences from Buddhist writers which seem to
support a rejection of outward concern for others. For example, Edward Conze has
written, "The Yogin can only come into contact with the unconditioned when he brushes
aside anything which is conditioned."1
Similarly, G.S.P. Misra writes, "In the final analysis, all actions are to be put
to cessation... The Buddha speaks of happiness involved in non-action which he further
says is an integral part of the Right Way (sammaa pa.tipadaa).2
Taken in isolation and out of context, these remarks can give the impression that
the path to Nibbaana implies developing a lack of concern towards everything in
sa.msaara. But is this inference sound? I would argue that it is not.
This is an issue which touches on the whole question of transferring concepts
across linguistic barriers, in this case Paali and English. It calls not only for
an understanding of how the concepts are used within the framework of the Paali
Buddhist texts, but also for an awareness of how the English terms used in translation
function and whether they are adequate. Inevitably, a dialogical approach between
two linguistic frameworks is necessary.
Detachment
Viveka and viraaga are the two Paali words which have been translated
as "detachment." The two, however, are not synonymous. The primary meaning of
viveka is separation, aloofness, seclusion. Often physical withdrawal is implied.
The later commentarial tradition, however, identifies three forms of viveka:
kaaya-viveka (physical withdrawal), citta-viveka (mental withdrawal),
and upadhi-viveka (withdrawal from the roots of suffering).
Kaaya-viveka, as a chosen way of life, was not uncommon during the time
of the Buddha. To withdraw from the household life, renounce possessions, and adopt
a solitary mendicancy was a recognized path. The formation of the Buddhist monastic
Sangha was grounded in the belief that going out from home to homelessness (agaarasmaa
anagaariya.m pabbajati) could aid concentrated spiritual effort. Yet to equate
the renunciation which the Buddha encouraged with a physical withdrawal which either
punished the body or completely rejected human contact would be a mistake.
The Buddha made it clear that the detachment of a noble disciple (ariyasaavaka)
— the detachment connected with the path — was not essentially a physical act of
withdrawal, let alone austerity. Kaaya-viveka was valuable only if seen as
a means to the inner purging and mental transformation connected with the destruction
of craving. This is illustrated in the Udumbarika Siihanaada Sutta in which the
Buddha claims that the asceticism of a recluse who clings to solitude could lead
to pride, carelessness, attention-seeking, and hypocrisy, if not linked to the cultivation
of moral virtues and the effort to gain insight through meditation.3
A further insight is given in the Nivaapa Sutta, which weaves a lengthy story
around the relationship of four herds of deer with a certain crop, representing
sensual pleasure, sown by the hunter (Maara) for the deers' ensnaring. Both the
ascetics who crave for pleasure, and those who deny themselves any enjoyment in
an extreme way, are destroyed. Referring to the latter, the Buddha says:
Because their bodies were extremely emaciated, their strength and energy
diminished, freedom of mind diminished; because freedom of mind diminished,
they went back to the very crop sown by Maara — the material things of this
world.4
The message of the sutta is that ascetic withdrawal can reduce the mind's ability
to discern. It can also lead to the repression of mental tendencies rather than
to their rooting out and destruction.
The detachment of which Buddhism speaks, therefore, is not an extreme turning
away from that which normally nourishes the human body. Neither is it a closing
of the eyes to all beauty, as is clear from the following:
Delightful, reverend AAnanda, is the Gosinga sal-wood. It is a clear moonlit
night; the sal-trees are in full blossom. Methinks deva-like scents are being
wafted around...5
This is an expression of delight uttered by Saariputta, an arahant, on meeting
some fellow monks one night.
One must look away from external acts and towards the area of inner attitudes
and motivation for a true understanding of the role of detachment in Buddhism. Physical
withdrawal is only justified if it is linked to inner moral purification and meditation.
In this light, citta-viveka and upadhi-viveka become necessary subdivisions
to bring out the full implications of detachment within Buddhist spiritual practice.
Upadhi-viveka, as withdrawal from the roots of suffering, links up with
viraaga, the second word used within Buddhism to denote detachment.
Viraaga literally means the absence of raaga: the absence of lust,
desire, and craving for existence. Hence, it denotes indifference or non-attachment
to the usual objects of raaga, such as material goods or sense pleasures.
Non-attachment is an important term here if the Paali is to be meaningful to speakers
of English. It is far more appropriate than "detachment" because of the negative
connotations "detachment" possesses in English. Raaga is a close relation
of upaadaana (grasping) which, within the causal chain binding human beings
to repeated births, grows from ta.nhaa (craving) and results in bhava
— continued sa.msaaric existence. The English word "non-attachment" suggests a way
of looking at both of them.
The Buddhist texts refer to four strands of grasping (upaadaana): grasping
of sense pleasures (kaamupaadaana), of views (di.t.thuupaadaana),
of rule and custom (siilabbatupaadaana), of doctrines of self (attavaadupaadaana).
All of these can also be described as forms of raaga or desire. To destroy
their power over the human psyche, attachment to them must be transformed into non-attachment.
Non-attachment or non-grasping would therefore flow from the awareness that no possession,
no relationship, no achievement is permanent or able to give lasting satisfaction;
from the discovery that there is no self which needs to be protected, promoted,
or defended; and from the realization that searching for selfish sensual gratification
is pointless, since it leads only to craving and obsession. Phrases which overlap
with attachment in this context and which can help to clarify its meaning are: possessiveness
in relationships, defensiveness, jealousy, covetousness, acquisitiveness, and competitiveness.
Through non-attachment, these are attenuated and overcome. There is nothing yet
in this description which points to a lack of concern for humanity or the world.
The emphasis is rather on inner transformation so that destructive and divisive
traits can be destroyed, making way for their opposites to flourish.
To take attachment to sense pleasures as an example, many suttas mention the
peril involved. The person attached to sense pleasures is likened to a "wet, sappy
stick" placed in water. As such a stick cannot be used to light a fire, so the one
addicted to sense pleasures cannot attain the "incomparable self-awakening" (anuttaraaya
sambodhaaya).6
He is one with whom Maara can do what he likes.7
He is like one holding a blazing torch, which must be dropped if burning and pain
is to be avoided.8
In fact, it is stressed that attachment to sense pleasures destroys the mind's ability
to think clearly and objectively. Viraaga, on the other hand, is linked to
the practice of mindfulness (satipa.t.thaana) and to seeing into the truth
of things. For Buddhists, therefore, non-attachment or detachment (viraaga)
does not mean a withdrawal from striving for truth but a movement towards seeing
the true nature of things more clearly. In contrast, saraaga (attachment)
leads to biased and false perceptions, since objects are sensed through a net of
predispositions towards attraction and aversion.
Seeing the truth through non-attachment can operate both at a mundane and a higher
level. At a mundane level, for instance, if greed always arises when an opportunity
for gaining quick wealth is glimpsed, wealth will never be seen objectively as it
really is — as transient, subject to change, and no answer to the search for happiness.
Because of raaga, neither the consequences nor the alternatives will be appreciated.
In fact, if any decision has to be made, the alternatives will not be seen clearly
as long as the mind is clouded by raaga. Dishonesty and the manipulation
of others in order to gain what is craved might result.
With reference to the higher stages of insight, satipa.t.thaana, viveka,
and viraaga are intertwined. Found in many suttas are words such as the following:
He (the monk) chooses some lonely spot to rest on his way — in the woods,
at the foot of tree, on a hillside... and returning there after alms round,
he seats himself, when his meal is done, cross-legged... (kaaya-viveka)9
Putting away the hankering after the world, he remains with a heart that
hankers not, and purifies his mind of lusts.10
Aloof from the pleasures of the senses, aloof from unskilled states of mind,
he enters and abides in the first jhaana... (citta-viveka and viraaga).11
The ultimate results of such practices are the four jhaanas or absorptions; the
verification, by direct vision, of the doctrine of karma; insight into the Four
Noble Truths; and eventually, the knowledge that release from rebirth has been gained.
Viraaga is, in fact, a prerequisite for attaining nibbaana and the
treatment of the word in the texts implies that the two are almost synonymous.
At this point, it is worth looking at how the word "detachment" has been used
in the Western tradition. In colloquial usage, to say that a person is detached
can be derogatory, implying that the person is not willing to become involved with
others or that he or she is neither approachable nor sympathetic. This current usage
must be borne in mind. Three strands of meaning, however, emerge from most dictionary
definitions. Primarily, detachment refers to the action and process of separating.
Flowing from this has come the military usage to describe the dispatch of a body
of troops. More relevant to this study, however, is the third body of meanings connected
with detachment as an attitude of mind. "Aloofness" and "indifference to worldly
concerns" are phrases used to describe this attitude. Although these might appear
to conform to the above-mentioned contemporary connotations, we find linked with
this (in Webster's Dictionary, for example) "freedom from bias and prejudice." Thus,
in both the Western tradition and the Eastern, "detachment" is linked with clarity
of perception, nonpartiality, and fair judgment.
Voices supporting this come from the Christian mystical tradition and the contemporary
scientific world. Classical Christian mysticism saw indifference to worldly and
material concerns as an essential component of the movement towards God. Fulfilling
God's will with total love and obedience was accompanied by detachment from the
worldly. In modern scientific research a similar quality is emphasized. A commitment
to truth is recognized but so is the necessity for a mind detached from the results
of research, detached from the wish for a particular outcome. For it is known that
if the scientist is searching for one particular scientific result, he might unconsciously
manipulate the experiments or observations in order to obtain that result.
Therefore, when looking at the implications of "detachment," it is worth taking
into account Western usage as well. The socially active person can be quick to look
down on those who appear either distanced from or untouched by the social, economic,
and political crises facing the world. But they should remember that detachment
can have a positive fruit even in relation to social activism: the ability to see
the truth more clearly and to judge more impartially.
To return to the Buddhist tradition: The Buddha was once faced with the remark
that the most worthy person is the one who speaks neither in dispraise of the unworthy
nor in praise of the praiseworthy. The Buddha disagreed with this. He replied that,
because of his ability to discriminate, the person who speaks in dispraise of the
unworthy and in praise of worthy is best.12
The Buddha rejects the self-distancing which refuses to take sides or to speak out
against what should be condemned. He criticizes the desire to keep the truth inviolate
and unspoken through a wish not to become involved with society. Viveka and
viraaga therefore do not imply the kind of withdrawal which is unconcerned
with what is good or bad for human welfare.
The fruits of non-attachment are not only linked with the gaining of knowledge,
the "incomparable self-awakening," but are also related to creating a just and harmonious
society. The Mahaadukkhakkhandha Sutta makes a direct connection between attachment
to sense pleasures and the movement towards chaos in society. Greed for the possessions
of another leads to disputes and contentions at the level of both the family and
nation, until "having taken sword and shield, having girded bow and quiver, both
sides mass for battle and arrows are hurled and swords are flashing."13
In the same sutta, theft, adultery, and vicious corporal punishment are likewise
attributed to sense pleasures and attachment to them.
In other texts, attachment to views is spoken about as a cause of disputes, especially
in the religious community. Yet the point drawn is relevant to the whole of society.
The result of a person asserting, "This is the very truth, all else is falsehood,"
is dispute. And: "If there is dispute, there is contention; if there is contention,
there is trouble; if there is trouble, there is vexation."14
Therefore, far from implying lack of concern for the welfare of others, detachment
from such things as sensual desires and the urge to assert dogmatic views is seen
as essential to it. We are back to the four strands of grasping and the need to
root these out.
Compassion
Karu.naa is the Paali word translated as compassion. Contemporary writers
have spoken of it thus:
It is defined as that which makes the heart of the good quiver when others are
subject to suffering, or that which dissipates the suffering of others.15
Compassion is a virtue which uproots the wish to harm others. It makes people
so sensitive to the sufferings of others and causes them to make these sufferings
so much their own that they do not want to further increase them.16
This (compassion) isn't self-pity or pity for others. It's really feeling one's
own pain and recognizing the pain of others... Seeing the web of suffering we're
all entangled in, we become kind and compassionate to one another.17
The above definitions vary. Yet central to all is the claim that karu.naa
concerns our attitude to the suffering of others. In the Buddhist texts the term
often refers to an attitude of mind to be radiated in meditation. This is usually
considered its primary usage. Nevertheless, the definitions of Buddhist writers
past and present, as well as the texts themselves, stress that it is also more than
this. Anukampaa and dayaa, often translated as "sympathy," are closely
allied to it.18
In fact, at least three strands of meaning in the term "compassion" can be detected
in the texts: a prerequisite for a just and harmonious society; an essential attitude
for progress along the path towards wisdom (pa~n~naa); and the liberative
action within society of those who have become enlightened or who are sincerely
following the path towards it. All these strands need to be looked at if the term
is to be understood and if those who accuse Buddhist compassion of being too passive
are to be answered correctly.
The foundation for any spiritual progress within Buddhism is the Five Precepts.
Rites, rituals, ascetic practices, and devotional offerings are all subservient
to the morality they stress. Compassion for the life, feelings, and security of
others is inseparably linked with the first, second, and fourth precepts.
- I undertake the rule of training to refrain from injury to living things
(paa.naatipaataa verama.nii sikkhaapada.m samaadiyaami).
- I undertake the rule of training to refrain from taking what is not given
(adinnaadaanaa verama.nii sikhaapada.m samaadiyaami).
- I undertake the rule of training to refrain from false speech (musaavaadaa
verama.nii sikkhaapada.m samaadiyaami).
For instance, the ideal of ahi.msaa (non-harming) of the first must flow
from compassion if it is to be effective. The Vasala Sutta makes this relationship
explicit, although the word dayaa, usually translated as sympathy or compassion,
is used and not karu.naa:
Whoever in this world harms living beings, once-born or twice-born, in whom
there is no compassion for living beings — know him as an outcast.19
(Ekaja.m vaa dija.m vaa pi yo paa.naani hi.msati, yassa paa.ne dayaa n'atthi
ta.m ja~n~naa 'vasalo' iti.)
Important to the exercising of this kind of compassion is the realization that
life is dear to all, as shown in the following Dhammapada verse:20
All tremble at violence
Life is dear to all
Putting oneself in the place of another
One should neither kill nor cause another
to kill.
(Sabbe tasanti da.n.dassa
Sabbesa.m jiivita.m piya.m
Attaana.m upama.m katvaa
Na haneyya na ghaataye.)
Here, non-harming and compassion flow both from a sensitivity to our own hopes
and fears and the ability to place ourselves in the shoes of others. Compassion
towards self and compassion towards others are inseparable.
The Buddha's teachings about statecraft and government also embody compassion
as a guiding principle. The Cakkavatti Siihanaada Sutta describes a state in which
the king ignores his religious advisers and does not give wealth to the poor. Poverty
becomes widespread and, in its wake, follow theft, murder, immorality in various
forms, and communal breakdown. The culmination is a "sword period" in which men
and women look upon one another as animals and cut one another with swords. In this
sutta, lack of compassion for the poor leads to the disintegration of society. Lack
of social and economic justice leads to disaster. In contrast, the ideal Buddhist
model for society, as deduced from the texts, would be one in which exploitation
in any part of its structure is not tolerated. Such a society would be rooted in
compassion. Compassion is its prerequisite.
To move to the second strand, I have already stated that the word "karu.naa"
was most often mentioned in the texts in the specialized context of meditation to
denote an important form of mind training. Here the emphasis is on each person's
pilgrimage towards Nibbaana rather than on interaction with other beings.
For example, the Kandaraka Sutta describes the path of a person who "does not
torment himself or others." Moral uprightness is stressed initially but the final
stages of the path are seen purely in terms of meditation and mind-training. At
this point, no mention is made of outgoing action:
By getting rid of the taint of ill-will, he lives benevolent in mind; and
compassionate for the welfare of all creatures and beings, he purifies the mind
of the taint of ill-will.21
In this context, the development of karu.naa plays an essential part in
the meditation practice that leads towards wisdom (pa~n~naa) and the destruction
of craving. The importance of this must not be underestimated. The development of
a compassionate mind is a direct preparation for right concentration (sammaa
samaadhi) and a prerequisite of Nibbaana:
If from a brahman's family... if from a merchant's family... if from a worker's
family... and if from whatever family he has gone forth from home into homelessness
and has come into this dhamma and discipline taught by the Tathaagata, having
thus developed friendliness (mettaa), compassion (karu.naa), sympathetic
joy (muditaa), and equanimity (upekkhaa), he attains inward calm
— I say it is by inward calm that he is following the practices suitable for
recluses.22
Karu.naa is one of the four "brahma-vihaaras" or sublime states,
along with mettaa, muditaa, and upekkhaa. The higher stages
are seen to rest on them because they have the power to weaken the defilements of
lust, ill-will, and delusion and to bring the mind to a state of peace. Rarely is
meditation mentioned without reference to them.
Yet a distinction must be made between mettaa and karu.naa. The
two are linked together at one level through the brahma-vihaaras. Yet, in
the texts, mettaa constantly remains a disposition, an interior attitude.
Karu.naa is more than this. Significant here is Buddhaghosa's treatment of
the word in the Visuddhimagga. When referring to the brahma-vihaaras,
he treats karu.naa in a similar way to mettaa. Yet, in a later
definition, his words can be translated as:
When there is suffering in others it causes good people's hearts to be moved,
thus it is compassion. Or, alternatively, it combats (ki.naati) others'
suffering and demolishes it, thus it is compassion. Or, alternatively, it is
scattered upon those who suffer, or extended to them by pervasion, thus it is
compassion.23
Bhikkhu ~Naa.namoli, in the notes to his translation, stresses that ki.naati
here does not come under the usual meaning of "to buy" but is linked with the Sanskrit
kr.naati, to injure or kill. Therefore he chooses to translate it as "combat,"
unmistakably connecting Buddhaghosa's definition of karu.naa with action.
In a later paragraph, Buddhaghosa adds that compassion succeeds "when it makes
cruelty subside and it fails when it produces sorrow."24
To Buddhaghosa, karu.naa was both a deliverance of the mind and liberative
action or, more exactly, a quality compelling people towards such action.
This emphasis on liberative action is seen supremely in AAcariya Dhammapaala's
words about the great compassion (mahaakaru.naa) and wisdom (pa~n~naa)
of the Buddha.25
The passage is structured in a series of parallel sentences, each one contrasting
and comparing the fruits of the two qualities. The following are selected from the
longer whole:
It is through understanding (= wisdom) that he fully understood others' suffering
and through compassion that he undertook to counteract it... It was through understanding
that he himself crossed over and through compassion that he brought others across...
Likewise it was through compassion that he became the world's helper and through
understanding that he became his own helper.
In the above passage, pa~n~naa or wisdom is connected with knowledge and
insight, and karu.naa or compassion with liberative action. The two are held
in corrective balance, counteracting the view that karu.naa is linked only
with the passivity of meditation. For the Enlightened One, karu.naa was what
impelled him to remain in society as teacher and liberator. He saw the need of the
murderer, Angulimaala, and a destructive life was put on another course.26
For forty-five years, he preached in the face of criticism, opposition, and misunderstanding,
in the knowledge that the Dhamma would be understood only by a few. He did not hide
the fact that suffering is universal, but made compassion the reverse side of this
truth, as is shown in the traditional stories of his encounters with Pa.taacaaraa,27
Kisaagotamii,28
and the slave girl Rajjumaalaa.29
He was not slow either to admonish monks who were unwilling to tend the sick among
them or to do the tending himself, however distressing the illness was: "Whoever
would attend on me should attend on the sick" (yo ma.m upa.t.thaheyya so gilaana.m
upa.t.thaheyya) has come down the centuries as words he said on one such occasion.30
This ideal was placed before the whole monastic Sangha. Although many members
of the Sangha may have failed to reach it, it is certain that some attained a stage
where compassionate, loving action had replaced selfishness. In the final stage
of the path, there is a sense in which action ceases. Yet it is the kind of action
which is dictated by attraction or aversion which must stop, action which has kammic
results, not that which flows from a purified mind filled with compassion. The mission
he set for himself and for the Sangha was one of compassionate, liberative action.
The first sixty arahants were sent out with the words:
Go forth, bhikkhus, for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many,
out of compassion for the world, for the good, benefit, and happiness of gods
and men. Let not two go by the same way.31
Mahaakassapa is praised because "he teaches the doctrine to others out of pity,
out of caring for them, because of his compassion for them."32
For the above disciples, all that had to be done for their release had been done.
They now embodied compassion. Compassion was their nature — Mahaa-karu.naa, great
compassion, rather than the elementary compassion which the novice on the path attempts
to radiate and practice. For these disciples, all desire for self-promotion and
self-achievement had been replaced with outward-moving energy. Therefore, any statement
which describes the enlightened Buddhist disciple as distant from society would
be false, or, more exactly, would be using inappropriate categories. The strength
of the concept of compassion within Buddhism is that it is both a powerful form
of mental purification and a form of liberative action.
Final Reflections
This paper began with questions raised by observers about the Buddhist notions
of detachment and compassion. They center around two main points: that the two concepts
seem to represent contradictory forces, the one moving away from society and the
other towards it; that the Buddhist concept of compassion is not active enough,
being more connected with personal spiritual growth than the altruistic reformation
of society.
Part of the problem is the linguistic framework and the modern connotations surrounding
such concepts as "detachment." The question would not arise in the same form for
those thinking exclusively in Paali and using the terms viraaga and karu.naa.
It would be evident to them that viraaga does not imply apathy and indifference
but a freedom from passion and attachment that is necessary if actions are not to
become biased or partial. For what passes as compassion can cloak emotions of a
very different kind, such as anger, attachment, or the wish to interfere.
With reference to the second point, a distinction in terms must be made. There
is a form of concern for self which is compatible with and even essential to altruism.
The care for oneself which enables one to feel empathy with others can be termed
"autism." Autism is necessary for altruism, since it is necessary to be able to
accept and even love oneself before one can show true empathy and compassion for
others, before one can feel what they feel. Autism is not egoism. Egoism is the
enemy of both autism and altruism. Egoism seeks to use others for the material welfare
and gain of self. Its "love" is possessive and manipulative. Egoism has to be destroyed
if karu.naa is to develop.
Viraaga, viveka, karu.naa and anukampaa are inter-related
terms within Buddhism. Compassion needs the clear insight that viragaa can
bring. The challenge for Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike is to realize this in
our lives. All societies need the active, liberative compassion which seeks to relieve
the suffering of others, establish greater justice, and assert the dignity and equality
of human beings. Karu.naa should certainly be seen in its concentrated meditative
form as a powerful and peace-giving discipline of the mind and an important part
of any spiritual path. But it should never be confined to this framework. It breaks
the framework as liberative action to relieve suffering and oppression.
Notes
1. Edward Conze, Buddhist
Thought in India, 1960, Ch.5.
2. G.S.P. Misra, Development
of Buddhist Ethics, p. 44.
3. D Sutta No. 25.
4. M I 156.
5. Ibid.
6. M I 240-42.
7. M I 173.
8. M I 130.
9. D I 67, etc.
10. D I 68, etc.
11. D I 73.
12. A II 100-1.
13. M I 86.
14. M I 499.
15. Naarada Mahaathera,
The Buddha and His Teachings (BPS, 1988), p.372.
16. Edward Conze, op.
cit., Ch.6.
17. Joseph Goldstein,
The Experience of Insight (BPS, 1980), pp.125-26.
18. Harvey Aronson in Love
and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980) looks
at the relationship between karu.naa and anukampaa and quotes Buddhaghosa (SA
II 169) to indicate that anukampaa and karu.naa are similar (p.11).
19. Sn 117.
20. Dhp. v, 130. Trans.
by Acharya Buddharakkhita.
21. M I 347.
22. M I 284.
23. The Path of Purification,
Bhikkhu ~Naa.namoli trans. (BPS, 1975), IX 92.
24. Ibid., IX 94.
25. From Paramatthama~njuusaa,
his commentary to the Visuddhimagga; quoted at Path of Purification,
Ch. VII, n.9. This passage has been studied by Aloysius Peiris in "Some Salient
Aspects of Consciousness and Reality in Pali Scholasticism as reflected in the
Works of AAcariya Dhammapaala," 1971.
26. M II 97.
27. See E.W. Burlingame,
Buddhist Legends (PTS, 1969).
28. Ibid., 2:257-60.
29. Vimaanavatthu,
No. 50.
30. Vin I 302.
31. Vin I 20.
32. S II 199-200.
About the Author
Elizabeth J. Harris studied Buddhism in Sri Lanka from 1986 to 1993
and obtained a Ph.D. degree from the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist
Studies, University of Kelaniya. She is now Secretary for Inter-faith Relations
in The Methodist Church in London. Her previous BPS publications include Violence
and Disruption in Society (Wheel No. 392/393) and Journey into Buddhism
(Bodhi Leaves No. 134).
Suggested Further Reading
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Source:
Bodhi Leaves No. 141 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1997). Transcribed from a file provided by the BPS, with minor revisions in accordance with the ATI style sheet. Pali diacritics are represented using the Velthuis convention. Copyright © 1997 Elizabeth J. Harris. Reproduced and reformatted from Access to Insight edition © 2005 For free distribution. This work may be republished, reformatted, reprinted, and redistributed in any medium. It is the author's wish, however, that any such republication and redistribution be made available to the public on a free and unrestricted basis and that translations and other derivative works be clearly marked as such.
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