The Sankhya Sutras of Kapila
HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced.
The existence of Soul.
Aph. 1. * Soul is; for there is no proof that it is not.
a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are aware of this, that 'I think;' because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the meaning.
Soul is not Body, &c.
Aph. 2. * This [Soul,] is different from the Body, &c.; because of heterogeneousness, [or complete difference between the two].
The usage of language is evidence for this.
Aph. 3. * Also because it [Soul,] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive,] case.
a. That is to say: Soul is different from Body, &c., also because the learned express it by the possessive case, in p. 421 such examples as, 'This [is] my body,' 'This [is] my understanding;' for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession].
b. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical], 'Rahu's head' [the trunkless Rahu being all head], 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies:
An objection disposed of.
Aph. 4. * It is not as in the case of the statue; because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing.
a. This expression by means of the possessive case, p. 422 [viz., 'My body' (a 3)] is not like 'The statue's body,' &c. In such a case as 'The statue's body,' there is a mere fiction; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints is with the thing;' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by evidence; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. Such is the meaning.
Soul's aim how accomplished.
Aph. 5. * Through the entire cessation of pain there is done what was to be done.
a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the p. 423 ceasing of Pleasure, also, that cannot be Soul's aim. To this he replies:
Pleasure no compensation for Pain.
Aph. 6. * Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul, as there is annoyance from Pain.
a. And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for he cessation of Pain simply; so that there is not an equality of gain and loss: [but a clear gain, in the desired release].
Pleasure sparingly dispensed.
Aph. 7. * For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy.
Pleasure undeserving of the name.
Aph. 8. * It [Pleasure,] is also mixed with Pain, therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,] Pain.p. 425
Cessation of suffering is a joy.
Aph. 9. * If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say; for there are two kinds [of things desired].
Aph. 10. * The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality; for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c.
This cleared up.
Aph. 11. * Though it [the Pain,] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul,] through non-discrimination.
a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the shape of a reflexion, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non-discrimination,' as the cause, owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning. And this has been set forth in the First Book.
Two reasons why non-discrimination must have been from eternity.
Aph. 12. * Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless; because, otherwise, two objections would present themselves.
a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first,] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated; p. 427 and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, &c., also: such is the meaning.
Non-discrimination, though from eternity, may be cut short.
Aph. 13. * It [non-discrimination, cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is; else, it could not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be].
a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless, in the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. For, otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, [though the beginningless antecedent non-entity of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the production of the jar]. Such is the meaning.
Bondage how destructible.
Aph. 14. * It [Bondage,] is annihilable by the alloted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light].
Aph. 15. * Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation; 2 [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not].
a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book, 3 viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c:
Bondage not innate.
Aph. 16. * Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [which cannot be innate].
Bondage does not recur.
Evidence of this.
Aph. 18. * Else, it [liberation,] would not be the Soul's aim, [which it is].
Force of the evidence.
Aph. 19. * What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable].
a. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound; because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and, therefore, such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim, [but emancipation final and complete].
b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it p. 431 that you have asserted [Book I., a 19,] the eternal freedom [of all souls alike]? To this he replies:
The nature of liberation.
a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen]; to which he replies:
An objection repelled.
Aph. 21. * Even in that case, there is no contradiction.
b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one's neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string], is attained, [on one's hearing where it is]. To this he replies:
Another objection repelled.
Aph. 22. * This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it]. 3
Utility of other means besides hearing.
Aph. 23. * Of others [viz., other means besides hearing] for the sake of confirmation, [there is need].
Formality in postures not imperative.
The efficient means of Concentration.
Aph. 25. * Mind without an object is Meditation.
a. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is 'Meditation,' i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word 'cause' is employed for 'effect.' For it will be p. 434 declared how Meditation effects this [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].
A distinction not without a difference.
Aph. 26. * If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the excluion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case].
Soul tinged by what does not belong to it.
Aph. 27. * Though it [Soul,] be unassociated, still there is a tingeing [reflexionally,] through Non-discrimination.
a. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, as it were, a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflexion, by those who discriminate the tinge [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to].
Its seeming presence explained.
How to be got rid of.
Aph. 29. * It [viz.,the aforesaid tinge,] is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.
The ancient dogma on this point.
a. That is to say: through the removal, by means of meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers.
Meditation may take place anywhere.
Aph. 31. * There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind.
Nature the material of the world.
Aph. 32. * Nature is the primal material; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.
Soul not the material of the world.
Aph. 33. * Not to Soul does this [viz., the material of the world,] belong, though it be eternal; because of its want of suitableness.
a. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies possession of qualities, and the being associable: [and,] by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal, [and, therefore, no product,] cannot serve as material.
b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,' 2 we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered this adverse suggestion, he replies:
The opposite view unscriptural.
a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof, 1 have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the Naiyayikas,] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation [of soul, as material, into the world, as product].
b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than p. 440 earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies:
Nature the ultimate material cause.
Aph. 35. * Though but mediately [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes,]; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiśeshikas].
Aph. 36. * It [Nature,] is all-pervading; because [its] products are seen everywhere.
a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, 'Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or act];' [for what is unlimited] and fills all space, can find no other space to move into]. To this he replies:
An objection parried.
Aph. 37. * Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms.
a. 'Motion' means action. Though it be present, this does not prevent its [Nature's,] being the radical cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other p. 441 Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vaiśeshikas: such is the meaning.
Nature the proper substitute for eight of the substances in the Nyaya list.
Aph. 38. * Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyayikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine].
Nature consists of the three Qualities.
Aph. 39. * Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence.
b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing; p. 442 since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, Emancipation would be inexplicable:
a. He states the concomitant 3 cause of diversified creation:
Nature treats every one according to his deserts.
Aph. 41. * The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert.
Contrary results from Nature how.
Aph. 42. * The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise.
a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is 'equipoise:' 2 through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same: such is the meaning.
Nature's energy does not debar emancipation.
Aph. 43. * Since [or when,] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil,when the king's purpose has been accomplished]. 1
a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies:
No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated.
Aph. 44. * Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause, 4 [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion].
a. But then, this arrangement could be possible then, [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls: but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. Having pondered this doubt, he says:
Multeity of Soul proved from the Veda.
Aph. 45. * The multeity of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself].
a. That is to say: the multeity of Soul is proved, absolutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, 'Whoso understand this, these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.' 3
Unity excluded by the supposion of Souls.
a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of 'Ignorance,' [which, according to the Vedanta, is no reality]; so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedantac dogma of] non-duality. With reference to this doubt, he says:
The Vedanta cannot evade non-duality.
Aph. 47. * Even by the two the authority is contradicted.
The establishment of the Vedanta tenet implies a contradiction.
Aph. 48. * The prima facie view [of the Vedanta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality].
Aph. 49. * [And,] in its [Soul's,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedantas say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction].
b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish p. 448 the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, object to itself. To this he replies:
Illuminating function of Soul.
Aph. 50. * This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent.
A salvo for the Vaidic view.
Aph. 51. * There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to p. 449 assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time'].
a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal:
The world's reality irrefragable.
Aph. 52. * The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture,] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].
a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep, 2 &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first, 3 [according to Book I., a 71].
Aph. 53. * Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].
a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form.
b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, be asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:
The real agent who.
Aph. 54. * Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.
Experience is got rid of when.
Aph. 55. * Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].
Paradise no security against transmigration.
Aph. 56. * Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to munane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].
This point enforced.
Aph. 57. * Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors].
A salvo for Scriptural text.
Aph. 58. * There is Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of Brahma]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate means].
Aph. 59. * And, in accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,] p. 453 is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.
a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it [here].
The Body's existence dependent on Soul.
Aph. 60. * This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].
a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls,] take place p. 454 without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies:
Desert not the author of the Body.
Aph. 61. * If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.
a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body] , should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant.
b. According to the system of the Vaiśeshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, p. 455 since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause [of the Body]:
Reason for this.
Aph. 62. * For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul].
Soul how limited and unlimited.
The real agent what.
Aph. 64. * The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiśeshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such]. 4
a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established p. 457 by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive agencies of Brahma and Rudra 1 [respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or peronality].
The real agent whence.
Aph. 65. * It is the same as in the arising of Desert.
a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,asince, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,ajust so Self-consciousness arises from time alone. as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof, also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.
Orthodox recognition of Brahma, Śiva, and Vishṇu, put forward.
Aph. 66. * The rest is from Mind, [the Great Principle].
a. What is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone; because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence towards others: such is the meaning. And by this aphorism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishṇu, owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct 2 [of the soul, which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy (see a 64)].
b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by? p. 459 With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this [regress] is valid; [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]:
A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.
Aph. 67. * The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some,] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants], is beginningless.
Aph. 68. * Or [the case is, likewise, one of infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchaśikha [holds].
Aph. 69. * [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world].
The summing up.
Aph. 70. * Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim.
Suggestions for Further Reading
2 Vide supra, p. 43, note 2, and p. 194, note 3. Prof. Cowell defines anwaya-vyatireka as 'affirmative and negative induction,' in his edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 315, note 3. See also his translation of the Kusumanjali, pp. 7 and 23. Ed.
4 Vijnana and Nageśa quote the text: ### 1 . Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva cite the longer passage: ### 2, 3, 1 . See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words ### 2 in the Bṛihadaraṇyaka p. 430 Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Śatapatha-brahmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 5. Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the twenty-third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a fact which suggests that my criticism on Vachaspati Miśra's quotation, ventured in the note above referred to, may be hasty. Ed.
3 The rare word dhwasti, thus rendered, Vijnana and Vedanti Mahadeva explain by dhwansa. Ed.
2 'Inertness [of mind]' is a better rendering of laya. Ed.
2 Muṇḍaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed.
4 Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste.' Ed.
1 'Lowest . . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' Ed.
3 Śatapatha-brahmaṇa, xiv., 7, 2, 15. Ed.
2 For 'injured,' &c,' read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.' Ed.
3 Instead of 'in which,' &c., read, '[consisting of] the Great One, &c.' Ed.
1 This is an appellation of Śiva. Ed.
2 The text here followed is very inferior. Ed.
Source: The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila with illustrative extracts from the commentaries translated by James R. Ballantyne third edition edited by Fitzedward Hall [London, Tr bner & Co.] 
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