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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself
through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in
the antahkarana, and the light of the real shines forth through
these states. The antahkarana of which ahamkâra is a moment,
is itself a beginningless system of ajńâna-phenomena containing
within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as
merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the
jîva or individual soul began his career.
Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.
We have already seen that the indefinite ajńâna could be
experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there
are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous
Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter
has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by
which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all
the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is
different from the category of the positive and the negative, has
only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the
true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can
be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character
as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed
order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,
all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajńâna or mâyâ is indeed
hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all
these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is
said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence
beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle
and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything
else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly
appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only
seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except
pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.
It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the
objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and
false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must
show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All
categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to
be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before
us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as
that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our
fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by
S'rîharsa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible
within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete
account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.
I shall give here, only one example.
Let us take the examination of the notion of difference
(_bheda_)from _Khandanakhandakhâdya_. Four explanations are
possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be
perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience
(_svarűpa-bheda_) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference
between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other
(_anyonyâbhâva_), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâttas think; (3) difference
means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the
Vais'esikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality
in itself like the prthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first
alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth
represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their
mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the
cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic
of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated
into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive
in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?
i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by
the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference
from something else, it is expected that something else such
as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also
be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if
the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated
together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction
becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what
we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from
something else, and if that thing from which the difference is
perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an
entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents
its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,
then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference
from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth
itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that the jug only indicates a term from which difference
is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,
for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent
of any association of its difference from other things,
and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If
it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation
to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference
from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty
comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the
cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of
the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would
also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but
identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character
of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other,
but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to
ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have
not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything
might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation
between these two, then that relation would require another
relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again
require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it
may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference
to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are
viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.
But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely
different from the perception of difference. It should also be
noted that the notion of difference is also different from the
notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say
that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say
that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear
as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.
The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things
for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different
from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is
the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the
difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and
not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This
shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the
thing perceived.
Again, in the second alternative where difference of two things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we
find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not
in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same
difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of
jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the
residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require
that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce
difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the
cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth
itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be
explained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhâva_) is explained
as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in
the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality
in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;
and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as
identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth
we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for
clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence
of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness
in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third
alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics
(_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the
vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence
as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if
the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless
vaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in the
negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences
they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics
as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of
things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the
other, then apart from the differences--the natural forms--the
things are reduced to formlessness (_nihsvarűpatâ_). If natural forms
(_svarűpa_) mean special natural forms (_svarűpa-vis'esa_) then as the
special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference,
the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones
would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there
is no such quality as prthaktva (separateness) which can explain
differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as
to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones
or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it
exists or not, and so forth.
The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and
dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters
of _Kathâvatthu_. In the great _Mahâbhasya_ on Pânini by Patańjali
also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who
took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all
its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove
that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was
non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and
self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was
only the void (_s'űnya_). S'ankara partially utilized this method in
his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rîharsa
again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after
having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our
everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought
to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we
cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of
all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led
to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not
exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention
was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajńâna
produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show
that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other
words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajńâna,
are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S'rîharsa
was followed by _Tattvadîpikâ_ of Citsukha, in which he generally
followed S'rîharsa and sometimes supplemented him with the
addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of
Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S'űnyavâda in
annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other
Vijńânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character
of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous
ultimate reality.
The Theory of Causation.
The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing
phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the
root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.
The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused
by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents,
as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered
insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedănta had before
it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded
certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of
phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.
In fact the concept of causation and production had in it
something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry
after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and
primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the
present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of
the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect
was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the
ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If
apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation
of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably
present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs
forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before,
and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The
Nyăya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a
general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular
kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding
moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the
other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing
more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature
of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable
condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyăya,
is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived
as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these
again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time
and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually
dependent upon each other (_anyonyâs'raya_) neither of these can
be conceived independently. Another important condition is
invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable
antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as
an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's
house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it
means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect,
it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing
[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are
always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]
to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence
and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of
that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also
it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence
of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it
is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated
with its accessory factors, then also the question remains
the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.
Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a
plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which
happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot
also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular
cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that
from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special
kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and _Nyâyamańjarî_), for out of the
same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate,
etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then
the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does
it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On
the former supposition the scattered factors being always present
in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means
something else above the specific factors, then that something always
existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation
(_sâmagrî_) be defined as the last movement of the causes
immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the
relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.
Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces
the effect, the very conception of causation which was required
to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved
in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce
its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically
inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out
the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable
series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics
of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajńâna of mâyâ,
and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in
themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all
carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and
some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure
being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The
true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through
all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon
it of ajńâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that
is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,
etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere
appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth
is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is
being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being
imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what
is called the _satkâryavâda_ or more properly the _satkâranavâda_
of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,
and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this
much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being
which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the
being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called
the _vivarttavâda_ as distinguished from the _sâmkhyayogaparinâmavâda_,
in which the effect is regarded as the real development
of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a
different kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but
when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called
_parinâma (kâranasvalaksanânyathâbhâvah parinâmah tadvilaksano
vivarttah_ or _vastunastatsamattâko'nyathâbhâvah parinâmah
tadvisamasattâkah vivarttah)_. Vedânta has as much to object
against the Nyâya as against the parinâma theory of causation
of the Sâmkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,
and actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the
light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate
things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality
however though phenomena are not identical with the cause,
they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam
vinaiva tadvyatirekena durvacam kâryyam vivarttah)_.
This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the
world, the different followers of S'ankara Vedânta in explaining
the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the
mâyâ, ajńâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes
on them both. Thus Sarvajnâtmamuni, the writer of
_Sanksepa-s'ârîraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman
should be regarded as the causal substance (_upâdâna_) of the
world-appearance, whereas Prakâs'âtman Akhandânanda, and Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the
mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs'vara should be regarded
as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance
is an evolution or parinâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs'vara,
whereas Îs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others
however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor
of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity
in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance
may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the
mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the
avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter
(_upâdâna_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom
both Îs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better
rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in
association with his avidyâ or ajńâna. Others however hold that
since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being
and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to
be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal
matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in parinâma.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of
the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva.
Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which
the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold
world of appearance. Prakâs'ânanda holds however in his _Siddhânta
Muktâvalî_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected
even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal
matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the
phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the
product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna
(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences
of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect
the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is
the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only
a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ
was used in the Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and
wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying
it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began
to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the Brhadâranyaka,
Pras'na, and Svetâs'vatara Upanisads the word means magic. It
is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upanisads the word mâyâ occurs only once in the Brhadâranyaka and once
only in the Pras'na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs
only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhaghosa
uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the _Lankâvatâra_
it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'ankara the
word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle
of creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the
phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.
It may also be mentioned here that Gaudapâda the teacher
of S'ankara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help
of the mâyâ doctrine. The Upanisads are permeated with the
spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not
pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or
enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gaudapâda asserts
clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that
the world does not exist in reality, that it is mâyâ, and not reality.
When the highest truth is realized mâyâ is not removed, for it is
not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own
airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gaudapâda who compared
the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects
seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable
of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and
unreal. The âtman says Gaudapâda is at once the cognizer and
the cognized, the world subsists in the âtman through mâyâ.
As âtman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily
follows that all experience is also illusory. S'ankara expounded
this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upanisads
and the Brahma-sűtra, but he seems to me to have done little
more than making explicit the doctrine of mâyâ. Some of his
followers however examined and thought over the concept of
mâyâ and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable
thereby substantially contributing to the development of
the Vedânta philosophy.
Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].
Pramâna is the means that leads to right knowledge. If
memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then
[Footnote 1: Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra and his son Râmakrsna worked out a
complete scheme of the theory of Vedântic perception and inference.
This is in complete agreement with the general Vedânta metaphysics.
The early Vedântists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory
nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.
It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as
worked out by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra he was largely indebted to the Mîmâmsâ
school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamâna s'abda and
anupalabdhi also Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra accepted the Mîmâmsâ view. The
Vedantins, previous to Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra, had also tacitly followed
the Mîmâmsâ in these matters.]
pramâna is to be defined as the means that leads to such right
knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge
(_pramâ_) in Vedânta is the knowledge of an object which has not
been found contradicted (_abâdhitârthavisayajńânatva_). Except
when specially expressed otherwise, pramâ is generally considered
as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired
(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections
are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a
few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive
moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired
in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedânta
considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise,
any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as
remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive
one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a
series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge
of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge
of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental
state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as
having remained unchanged all through the series of moments.
There is of course this difference between the same percept of a
previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh
elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though
the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned
remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses
though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.
When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state
representing the book is not changed every second, and hence
there can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental
states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous
one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains
the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any
change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the
same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains
the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the
external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the
absolute is realized.
When the antahkarana (mind) comes in contact with the
external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as
it were into their forms, it is said that the antahkarana has
been transformed into a state (_vrtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the
antahkarana has assumed the shape or form of the object of its
knowledge, the ignorance (_ajńâna_) with reference to that object is
removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness
(_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by
ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object
is thus the self-shining of the cit through a vrtti of a form
resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes
that by the action of ajńâna, pure consciousness or being
is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of
the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is
but the transformation of ignorance (ajńâna), the former cannot
manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance
they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The
diversified objects of the world are but transformations of
the principle of ajńâna which is neither real nor unreal. It
is the nature of ajńâna that it veils its own creations. Thus
on each of the objects created by the ajńâna by its creating
(_viksepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (âvarana) capacity.
But when any object comes in direct touch with antahkarana
through the senses the antahkarana becomes transformed into
the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil
on that particular ajńâna form--the object, and as the self-shining
cit is shining through the particular ajńâna state, we
have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is
in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the
ajńâna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls
and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,
[Footnote 1: Vedânta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The
same antahkarana, according to its diverse functions, is called mânâs,
buddhi, ahamkâra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called
mânâs, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As
presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness ahamkâra, and as
producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications
or states (vrtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special
kind of modification of ajńâna as antahkarana).]
etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary
and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajńâna forms
so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the
subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on
the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation
(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective
consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the
specific mental states
(_tattadindriyayogyavisayâvacchinnacaitanyâbhinnatvam
tattadâkâravisayâvacchinnajńânasya tattadams'e pratyaksatvam_).
This union in perception means that the objective has at that
moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of
the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the antahkarana
is called jîvasâksi.
Inference (_anumâna_), according to Vedânta, is made by our
notion of concomitance (_vyâptijńâna_) between two things, acting
through specific past impressions (_samskâra_). Thus when I see
smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke
with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I
infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and
the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance
revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between
the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is
generated by the perception of two things together, when no
case of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicârâjńâna_)
regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether
subjective, the Vedântist does not emphasize the necessity
of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhűyodars'anam
sakrddars'anam veti vis'eso nâdaranîyah_). Vedânta is
not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of
concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the
concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory
instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedânta whether this
concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.
The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance
(_anvayavyâpti_) that the Vedânta allows. So the
Vedânta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyâya
supported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence
with agreement in absence), _kevalânvayi_ (by universal agreement
where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and _kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedânta
advocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijńa_ (the hill is fiery);
(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _drstânta_ (as in the
kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyâya maintained [Footnote
ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedânta as
being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the
one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,
we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam
sarvam mithyâ Brahmabhinnatvât yedevam tadevam yathâ s'uktirűpyam_).
First premiss (_pratijńâ_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second
premiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss
(_drstânta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote
ref 2].
Âtman, Jîva, Îs'vara, Ekajîvavâda and Drstisrstivâda.
We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous
(_svayamprakâs'a). But what does this mean? Vedânta
defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but
is yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati
aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the
capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness
without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever
anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character
as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not
be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.
This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can
produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its
objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for
its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug,
the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness
to manifest it, then that might again require another, and
that another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavasthâ_). If consciousness
did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,
then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he
had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness
(_anubhűti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance
[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijńâ, hetu and udâharana, or
udâharana, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyâya, viz.
pratijńa, hetu, udâharana, upanaya and nigamana.]
[Footnote 2: Vedântic notions of the pramâna of upamana, arthapatti,
s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mîmâmsâ view, do not
require to be treated here separately.]
of all our world experience. This goes directly against
the jńâtatâ theory of Kumârila that consciousness was not immediate
but was only inferable from the manifesting quality
(_jńâtatâ_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.
Now Vedânta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness
is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object
of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in
consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it
is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The
self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is
never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the
perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association
comprehended under the term ahamkâra (ego). The real self is
identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.
This real self called the âtman is not the same as the jîva or
individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences
of worldly life. Îs'vara also must be distinguished from this
highest âtman or Brahman. We have already seen that many
Vedântists draw a distinction between mâyâ and avidyâ. Mâyâ
is that aspect of ajńâna by which only the best attributes
are projected, whereas avidyâ is that aspect by which impure
qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are
more of a creative, generative (_viksepa_) type, whereas in the latter
veiling (_âvarana_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation
of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with mâyâ and
avidyâ (also called ajńâna) was believed respectively to explain the
phenomenal Îs'vara and the phenomenal jîva or individual. This
relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upâdhi or pratibimba,
and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is
like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,
though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes
the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The
sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the
impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may
be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of
water and yield different kinds of images possessing different
characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally
have all the appearance of reality. The other conception
of the relation is that when we speak of âkâs'a (space) in the jug
or of âkâs'a in the room. The âkâs'a in reality does not suffer any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In
reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_)
within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited
by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the
âkâs'a limited within it will remain as separate from the âkâs'a
limited within the room.
Of the Vedântists who accept the reflection analogy the followers
of Nrsimhâs'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected
in the mâyâ, Îs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the
avidyâ the individual or jîva. Sarvajńâtmâ however does not
distinguish between the mâyâ and the avidyâ, and thinks that
when the cit is reflected in the avidyâ in its total aspect as cause,
we get Îs'vara, and when reflected in the antahkarana--a product
of the avidyâ--we have jîva or individual soul.
Jîva or individual means the self in association with the ego
and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,
suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jîva also three
stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antahkarana
is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajńâna and the
jîva in this state is called prâjńa or ânandamaya. In the dream-state
the self is in association with a subtle body and is called
taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a
subtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure
state is called Brahman, when associated with mâyâ it is called
Îs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as
controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross
elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virât
purusa.
The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of
as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and
the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and
when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâsika (illusory).
Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajńâna is one
there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara;
but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the
ajńâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is
Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajńâna gives
us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the antahkarana
as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and
apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent
on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed
by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.
Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the
avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible
of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna)
by the antahkarana (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond
it; the diversity of antahkaranas accounts for the diversity
of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are
not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining
or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the
Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a
phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more
powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of
us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and
both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some
Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and
that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his
imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will
continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his
experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary
individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary
salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of
the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva
and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the
doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).
The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some
Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance
has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person
creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective
datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception
of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a
rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and
agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen
the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and
there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory
perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no
corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must
be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds
that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently
and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison
with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant
and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance.
According to the other view phenomena are not
objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that
the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the
perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion
occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist
before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,
and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore
called the theory of drstisrstivâda, i.e. the theory that the
subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there
are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.
In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of
the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with
which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective
phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajńâna,
but still these phenomena of the ajńâna are there as the common
ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective
epistemology whereas the drstisrstivâda has no proper
epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined
by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications
of the avidyâ. The drstisrstivâda theory approaches
nearest to the Vijńânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference
that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being
Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable
reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary
perceptions are but impositions on it.
The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that
both are modifications of ajńâna. It is indeed difficult to
comprehend the nature of ajńâna, though its presence in consciousness
can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism
all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and
become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains
the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these
indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes
of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue
from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in
its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms
and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,
incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under
certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,
and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a
positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only
the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms
and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a
cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being
apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that
is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have
being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing
the characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes of
ajńâna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our
experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to
conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajńâna.
Moreover such is the nature of ajńânas that they are knowable
only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous
Brahman or âtman. Being as such is the highest truth, the
Brahman. The ajńâna states are not non-being in the sense of
nothing of pure negation (_abhâva_), but in the sense that they are
not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,
the ajńâna, and this illumination means nothing more than a
false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajńâna
if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness,
and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and
mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these
cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone
that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajńâna
states in themselves as apart from the âtman we fail in a dilemma,
for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and
when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus
apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other
kind of its existence is known to us. If ajńâna had been a non-entity
altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive
entity then it would never cease to be; the ajńâna thus is a
mysterious category midway between being and non-being and
undefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is
called _tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvâcya_ or undefinable and undeterminable
either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal
in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness
it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they
are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible
as to their real nature or mutual relation, and
comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness,
but apart from these no rational conception of them can be
formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajńâna
(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in
consciousness and depending on this the Drstisrstivâdins asserted
that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence
of avidyâ and that beyond that no objective common ground
could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of
Vedânta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining
our common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasathâ_) we may
think that we have an objective world before us as the common
field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and
operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be
interpreted in the light of the Vedânta metaphysics.
The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the
âtman, the one highest reality, secondly as jîva or the âtman as
limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated
from the âtman, but âtman is regarded as identical with the psychosis
thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _jîvasâksi_ or
perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jîva comprehends,
knows, or experiences; thirdly the antahkarana psychosis or
mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyâ manifestations,
just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of
avidyâ phenomena or objective entities. The antahkarana is not
only the avidyâ capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences,
but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of
past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The
antahkarana is always turning the various avidyâ modes of it into
the jîvasâksi (jîva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and
these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed
into experience. These avidyâ states of the antahkarana
are called its vrttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the
vrttiajńânas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed
upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness
and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The forms of ajńâna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only
so long as they do not come into relation to these vrttis of
antahkarana, for the ajńâna can be destroyed by the cit only in the
form of a vrtti, while in all other forms the ajńâna veils the cit
from manifestation. The removal of ajńâna-vrttis of the antahkarana
or the manifestation of vrtti-jńâna is nothing but this, that
the antahkarana states of avidyâ are the only states of ajńâna
which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous âtman
(_adhyâsa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of the
avidyâ phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity
consists in this that avidyâ in this form cannot be superimposed
on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These
avidyâ phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in
all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond
consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyâ
phenomena as antahkarana states that they coalesce with the
avidyâ states and render themselves objects of consciousness or
have their veil of âvarana removed. It is thus assumed that in
ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the antahkarana
goes out of the man's body (_s'arîramadhyât_) and coming in
touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,
and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which
is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.
The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested
(though these were taking place on the background of
the same self-luminous Brahman or âtman as forms of the highest
truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajńâna phenomena
in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous.
It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena
that the antahkarana could be transformed into corresponding
states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed
the antahkarana states and the objects with which these states or
vrttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the
vrttis alone has the power of removing the ajńâna veiling the
cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,
or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of
appearance and due to avidyâ. And it is only from the point of
view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects
can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together
through the antahkaranavrtti, which makes the external objects translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajńâna
which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the
object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected
through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The
pratyaksa-pramâ or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the
pure consciousness, reflected through the vrtti and identical with
the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by
it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three
consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective
phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jîva
or pramâtâ, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the vrtti
of the antahkarana; when these three unite perception is effected.
Pramâ or right knowledge means in Vedânta the acquirement
of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by
experience (_abâdhita_). There is thus no absolute definition of
truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long
as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it
is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted
by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the
knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true
absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness
which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The
truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out
whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience
or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to
be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be
contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.
The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated
by a false identification of antahkarana transformations as
pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated
the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In
continuous
perception of anything for a certain time as an object
or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or vrtti is said to last in the
same way all the while so long as any other new form is not
taken up by the antahkarana for the acquirement of any new
knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the
hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the antahkarana
vrtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter
of inference, for the antahkarana vrtti cannot be in touch with the
fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as
inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired
perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is
odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal
wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it
to be odoriferous. Vedânta does not admit the existence of the
relation called _samavâya_ (inherence) or _jâti_ (class notion); and
so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the
other class called inference, and holds that both perception and
inference are but different modes of the transformations of the
antahkarana reflecting the cit in the corresponding vrttis. The
perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the antahkarana
vrtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is
in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of
the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in
the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective
cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that
through the vrtti the same reality subsisting in the object and
the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred,
being away from contact with antahkarana, has apparently
a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness.
Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing
the same identical reality in the object and the subject by
antahkarana contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced
by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically
to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta
before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge
produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (_s'âbda_)
knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the antahkarana
vrtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyaksa.
The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same
as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as
represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the
unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but
only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception
already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from
"this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa
knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness
when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the
knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet
from the point of view of intrinsic significance (_tâtparya_) one
identical reality only is indicated. Vedânta does not distinguish
nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'âbda
perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the
condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the
sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas
in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different
ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (_râjapurusa
âgacchatî_). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is
signified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnote
ref 1].
It is not out of place to mention in this connection that
Vedânta admits all the six pramânas of Kumârila and considers
like Mîmâmsâ that all knowledge is self-valid (_svatah-pramâna_).
But pramâ has not the same meaning in Vedânta
as in Mîmâmsâ. There as we remember pramâ meant the
knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such
all knowledge was pramâ, until practical experience showed the
course of action in accordance with which it was found to be
contradicted. In Vedânta however there is no reference to action,
but pramâ means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition
of self-validity as given by Mîmâmsâ Vedânta adds another
objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svatah-prâmânya
as is not vitiated by the presence of any dosa (cause
of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedânta of course
does not think like Nyâya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence,
etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,
nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the
Mîmâmsists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It
adopts a middle course and holds that absence of dosa is a necessary
condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that
this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to
be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,
but Vedânta says that as it requires only a negative condition
for the absence of dosa, the objection does not apply to it, and it
holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition
for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyâya,
then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.
But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be
[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâsâ_ and _S'ikhâmani._]
attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedânta was bound to
follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the
pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else
for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal
forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance
would come to be valid; so it held that knowledge
could be regarded as valid only when there was no dosa
present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge
was false and had no validity, because there was the
avidyâ-dosa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was
valid in which there was no dosa. Validity (prâmânya) with
Mîmâmsâ meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to
practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedânta it meant
correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of
dosa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the
correctness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
Vedânta Theory of Illusion.
We have already seen that the Mîmâmsists had asserted that
all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathârthâh
sarve vivâdaspadîbhűtâh pratyayâh pratyayatvât_). Even
illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the
distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and
the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedânta objects to this,
and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which
is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is
said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.
non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),
then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,
and negation with Mîmâmsâ is nothing but the bare presence of the
locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but
the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception
of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely
and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for
argument's
sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas
is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one
could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping
down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive
[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâsâ, S'ikhâmani, Maniprabhâ_ and
Citsukha
on svatahprâmanya.]
conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical
movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect
perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated
and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver
appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the
movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For
the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us
to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus
I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite
this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as
if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mîmamsâ position
may be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vedânta thinks that the illusion
is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon
of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;
the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion
is generated by the dosa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the
phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific dosas.
The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described
thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by dosas a
mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me
is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state
of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidyâ
(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence
of the dosa, and this disturbance along with the impression of
silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the
appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver
appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state
generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two
transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal
illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness
(_sâksicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations,
one in the avidyâ states forming the illusory objective silver
phenomenon, and another in the antahkarana-vrtti or mind state.
But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,
their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have
one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of
illusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacanîya-khyâti_) illusory silver
is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver
occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedânta, namely the
[Footnote 1: See _Vivarana-prameya-samgraha_ and _Nyâyamakaranda_ on
akhyâti refutation.]
_pâramârthika_ or absolute, _vyavahârika_ or practical ordinary
experience, and _prâtibhâsika,_ illusory. The first one represents
the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due
to dosa. The difference between vyavahârika and prâtibhâsika
is that the dosa of the vyavahârika perception is neither discovered
nor removed until salvation, whereas the dosa of the
prâtibhâsika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such
as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of
our ordinary experience, and thus the prâtibhâsika experience
lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavahârika. But just
as the vyavahârika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications
of the ajńâna, as apart from our subjective experience and
even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is
also regarded as a modification of avidyâ, an undefinable creation
of the object of illusion, by the agency of the dosa. Thus in the
case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver
is created by the dosa in association with the senses, which is
called the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacanîya_) silver of illusion.
Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same
but the avidyâ of antahkarana suffers modifications (_parinâma_)
on account of dosa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.
The illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the point
of view of the cit and parinâma from the point of view of
avidyâ, for the difference between vivartta and parinâma is, that
in the former the transformations have a different reality from
the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),
while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality
as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same
stuff as the avidyâ whose transformations it is). But now a
difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to
a coalescing of the cit underlying the antahkarana-vrtti as modified
by dosa and the object--cit as underlying the "this" before
me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the
experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that
"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place
in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of
the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion
"I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection
with a previous vrtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing
of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this
is"
according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In
dreams
also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception
of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are
generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are
imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded
merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the
form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not
that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses
are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,
but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,
time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that
since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to
last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought
to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking
stages the antahkarana is being constantly transformed into different
states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were
causing the dream cognitions. This is called _nivrtti_ (negation)
as distinguished from _bâdha_ (cessation). The illusory creation of
dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these
cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no dosa of
sleep the antahkarana is active and suffering modifications in
accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is
called nivrtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience
it, whereas bâdha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation
ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell
the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this
was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived
as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality
was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective
illusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is
transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon
it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds
of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable
silver (_anirvacanîya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attribution
of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory
silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion
that it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyathâkhyâti_
form of illusion as advocated by Nyâya. Vedânta admits that
when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other
by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion
is of the form of anyathâkhyâti; but if one of the things is not
present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not
of the anyathâkhyâti type, but of the anirvacanîyakhyâti type.
Vedânta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed
that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance
was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous
in all our experiences. The world appearance is an
illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it
is a misattribution (_anyathâkhyâti_) of the characteristic of the
Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which
manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,
just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of
silver its reality.
Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation.
Vedânta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the
study of Vedânta and is instructed by the preceptor--"Thou
art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge,
and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory.
The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedânta are (1)
that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper
accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of
the knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another,
he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such
as daily prayer, etc. called _nitya-karma_) and occasionally obligatory
duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son,
called _naimittika-karma_) and must have avoided all actions for
the fulfilment of selfish desires (_kâmya-karmas_, such as the
performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited
actions (e.g. murder, etc. _nisiddha-karma_) in such a
way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no
karma is generated by the _nitya_ and _naimittika-karma_, and as
he has not performed the _kâmya_ and prohibited karmas, he has
acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified
his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of
fitting the mind for Vedânta instruction (called _sâdhana_) he
can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedânta instruction.
These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this
life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for
all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge,
(4) control over the senses by which these are restrained
from everything but that which aids the attainment of right
knowledge (_dama_), (a) having restrained them, the attainment
of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards
worldly enjoyments (_uparati_), (b) power of bearing extremes
of heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment
of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and
Upanisads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing
the above qualities should try to understand correctly
the true purport of the Upanisads (called _s'ravana_), and by
arguments in favour of the purport of the Upanisads to
strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upanisads (called
_manana_) and then by _nididhyâsana_ (meditation) which includes
all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth
as one. Vedânta therefore in ethics covers the ground of
Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding
the difference between purusa and prakrti, with Vedânta
salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman
alone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. Mîmâmsâ asserts
that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the
supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance
with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good
and the removal of evil. But Vedânta holds that though the
purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mîmâmsâ has it, yet this
is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the
goal is clearly as the Upanisads indicate it, namely the attainment
of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic
duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was
believed by many (e.g. Vâcaspati Mis'ra and his followers) that
due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a
great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others
believed (e.g. Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers) that it served to
bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors,
etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became
easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.
In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajńânas removed
[Footnote 1: See _Vedântasâra_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]
are only smaller states of ajńâna, whereas when the
Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajńâna as a whole is removed.
Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a
state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when
this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which
at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajńâna
modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed,
only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its
own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece
of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn
the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge
would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and
at last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].
The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman
as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss
shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as
illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but
limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also
are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste
of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being
of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent
beings as the _sattâ_ (being as class notion) of the naiyâyika, but
the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness
and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (_sat_) is pure
bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyâ during
mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the
question, how the avidyâ came forth and stayed during the world-appearance.
It is best to remember that the category of the
indefinite avidyâ is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation
and destruction. Vedânta however believes that even when the
true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a
while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it.
Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like
an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer
acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe
karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and
there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of
perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of
beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any
[Footnote 1:_Siddhântales'a_.]
of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any
knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is
called _jîvanmukta_, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all
world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone
in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the
stage [Footnote ref 1].
Vedânta and other Indian Systems.
Vedânta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyâya, and most of
its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it.
S'ankara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and
inconsistencies in many of the Nyâya conceptions, such as the
theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavâya,
the conception of jâti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to
still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of
S'rîharsa, Citsukha, Madhusűdana, etc. It was opposed to Mîmâmsâ so
far as this admitted the Nyâya-Vais'esika categories, but agreed
with it generally as regards the pramânas of anumâna, upamiti,
arthâpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter
in Mîmâmsâ with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting
power of knowledge. But it differed from Mîmâmsâ
in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate
discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to
ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties
to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest
knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties
only so long as he was not fit for Vedânta instruction and
studies.
With Sâmkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedânta seems to
be very close. We have already seen that Vedânta had accepted
all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that
were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedânta
and Sâmkhya was this that Sâmkhya believed, that the stuff of
which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the
purusas. In later times Vedânta had compromised so far with
Sâmkhya that it also sometimes described mâyâ as being made
up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedânta also held that according
to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications
[Footnote 1: See _Pańcadas'î_.]
[Footnote 2: See S'ankara's refutation of Nyâya, _S'ankara-bhâsya_, II.
ii.]
of the mâyâ. Thus Îs'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure
sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in
Vedânta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sâmkhya
held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that mâyâ was
believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it
was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from
what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial
nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long
as it appeared. Prakrti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable
as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation,
but even then it was believed to be a combination of
positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals
composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged
to it with which it could be defined. Mâyâ however was undemonstrable,
indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a
separate category of the indefinite. Sâmkhya believed in the
personal individuality of souls, while for Vedânta there was only
one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the mâyâ
transformations. There was an adhyâsa or illusion in Sâmkhya
as well as in Vedânta; but in the former the illusion was due
to a mere non-distinction between prakrti and purusa or mere
misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedânta there
was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable
creation. Causation with Sâmkhya meant real transformation,
but with Vedânta all transformation was mere appearance.
Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to
see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems
during the Upanisad period each was built up from very similar
ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested
themselves into the present divergences of the two systems.
Though S'ankara laboured hard to prove that the Sâmkhya
view could not be found in the Upanisads, we can hardly be
convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more
he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sâmkhya
thought had its origin in the Upanisads. Sâ'ankara and his
followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from
the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'űnya
of Nâgârjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between
pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of
S`ankara to the self-luminosity of the Vijńânavâda Buddhism can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth
in the accusations against S'ankara by Vijńâna Bhiksu and
others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to
think that S'ankara's philosophy is largely a compound of
Vijńânavâda and S'űnyavâda Buddhism with the Upanisad
notion of the permanence of self superadded.
Suggested Further Reading
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