The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila

   Aph. 11.* There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken].

   a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none;' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy3 is not established, since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning.

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   b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] Testimony [to there being a Lord]:

   Aph. 12.* Moreover, there is Scripture for [this world's] being the product of Nature, [not of a Lord].

   a. Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause.

   b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms],3 the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section,4 viz., 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,' [conjoined with Soul].

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   Aph. 13.* With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance.

   a. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.

   b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies:

   Aph. 14.* Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.3

   a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is 'a vicious circle,' [literally, p. 323 a resting of each on the other, alternately], a resting a thing on itself; or, in short, a regressus in infinitum.

   b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika], 'but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,' he replies:

   Aph. 15.* It is not as in the case of seed and sprout; for Scripture teaches that the world has a beginning.

   a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a beginning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. Such is the meaning.

   b. But then, [you Vedántís will say], according to us, Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in p. 324 the shape, specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitariness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it:

   Aph. 16.* Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge.

   a. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (avidyá) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then Brahma, soul itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning. [Further]:

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   Aph. 17.* Were there not exclusion, then there would be resultlesseness.

   a. But, if, the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.

   b. He censures the other alternative, [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]:

   Aph. 18.* If it [Ignorance,] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predicable], in like manner, of the world, also.

   a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties, p. 326 be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import.

   Aph. 19.* If it [Ignorance,] were of that nature it would be something that had a commencement.2

   a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántís (see § 15, b.)], but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such recited p. 327 texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,'12 &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul.

   b. By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,4 he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit:

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   Aph. 20.* There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature.

   a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another,] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning.

   b. He states further proof, also:

   Aph. 21.* It [the existence of Merit,] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c.

   a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it:

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   Aph. 22.* There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs.

   a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs.

   b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit:

   Aph. 23.* It is thus, moreover, in both cases.

   a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit.

   Aph. 24.* If the existence [of Merit] be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both.

   a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction p. 330 would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning.

   b. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.:

   Aph. 25.* It is of the internal organ3 [not of soul] that Merit, &c., are the properties.

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   a. In the expression '&c.' are included all those that are stated, in the Vaiśeshika Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul.2

   b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, be replies]:

   Aph. 26.* And of the Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment.

   a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron,] belongs to the iron.

   b. In regard to the doubt, 'Why, again, do we not deny p. 332 them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c.?' he says:

   Aph. 27.* By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists].

   a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness, &c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the 'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things, viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the meaning.

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   b. And the employment [of the argument] is this:

   c. But then the Chárváka, next, doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion], that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.3

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   Aph. 28.* Not from once apprehending is a connexion established.

   a. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a 'connexion,' i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened,] is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows1 [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up:

   Aph. 29.* Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them.

   a. 'Consociation of characters,' i.e., consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' [furnishing solid ground for inference], p. 335 which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of 'both,' the predicate and the reason, or in the case of 'one of them,' the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e.g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness,' [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import.

   b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e.g., of some such power as is to be mentioned [in § 31]:

   Aph. 30.* It [Pervadedness,] is not [as some think (see § 31),] an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five (Book I., § 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [praeter rationem].

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   a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed consociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose, further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes 'pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes 'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply. Such is the meaning.

   b. He states the opinion of others:

   Aph. 31.* [But certain] teachers say that it [Pervadedness,] is [another principle, in addition to the twenty-five,] resulting from the power of the thing itself.

   a. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is, positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of power, generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.' But [they continue,] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever the thing is, [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. For smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore [contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the p. 337 above-stated definition; for, according to our doctrine, the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. Such is the import.

   Aph. 32.* Panchaśikha2 says that it ['Pervadedness,'] is the possession of the power of the sustained.

   a. That is to say: Panchaśikha holds that pervadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and that 'Pervadedness'3 is the having the power which consists in being the sustained; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.; p. 338 [and this means that each product, in succession] is sustained by what precedes it in the series].

   b. But then, why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this he [Panchaśikha,] replies:

   Aph. 33.* The relation is not an essential power; for we should have [in that case,] a tautology.

   a. But 'the relation,' viz., 'Pervadedness,' is not an essential power; for we should [thus] have a tautology; because, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so, also, there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature, of which Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning.

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   b. He himself explains the 'Tautology:'

   Aph. 34.* Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer].

   a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism.

   b. He [Panchaśikha,] mentions another objection:

   Aph. 35.* And because it [Pervadedness,] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c.

   a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the p. 340 character] of the 'sustained' is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no 'Pervadedness' then. Such is the import.

   b. But then what? Panchaśikha says that 'Pervadedness' is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke,] is not [as token of something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this he says:

   Aph. 36.* Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the 'sustained,' then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers p. 341 referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much].

   a. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness,' it would be really settled 'by the like argument.' i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power, also, [§ 31. a.].

   b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities,] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions].

   c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge,3 in the shape of [the objection p. 342 of] its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words:

   Aph. 37.* The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser.

   a. To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expressibleness; to the 'word,' the power termed expression: simply this is their 'connexion;' their interrelation, as it were.3 p. 343 From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import.

   b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers [in question]:

   Aph. 38.* The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means].

   a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37,] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sáhitya-darpaṉa, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name, [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].

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   Aph. 39.* There is no restriction to what is to be done; because we see it both ways.

   a. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37,] should occur only in the case of 'something [directed] to be done;' because, in [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., [§ 38,] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant], also, as well as in regard to what is to be done.

   Aph. 40.* He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.

   a. Here he entertains a doubt:

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   Aph. 41.* Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.

   a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses:

   Aph. 42.* Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrificings, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently.

   a. What is asserted [in § 41,] is not the case; since sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, are really, in themselves, 'what constitutes merit,' i.e., what is enjoined by the Veda, 'preeminently,' i.e., because of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of which we are perfectly conscious,] are not something transcending intuition. But 'what constitutes merit' [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition,] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings p. 346 &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. Such is the meaning.

   b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that, inasmuch as it [the Veda,] is superhuman, there can be no instruction by any competent person, [in regard to its import]:

   Aph. 43.* The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge].

   a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of actions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies:

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   Aph. 44.* This really takes place; because they [viz., the words,] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted.

   a. He defines the, peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:3

   Aph. 45.* The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production.

   a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No':

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   Aph. 46.* They [the Vedas,] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] their maker.

   a. Supply, 'because we deny that, there is a Lord.'1 [This is] simple.

   b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says:

   Aph. 47.* Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so, [by his want of power] neither of these can be author of the Vedas].4

   a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies:

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   Aph. 48.* As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man.

   a. [This is] plain.

   b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:

   Aph. 49.* Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c.

   a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,3 that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning.

   b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal p. 350 Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:

   Aph. 50.* That [only] is Man's work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place.2

   a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes place 'an effort of understanding,' i.e., a consciousness that Thought preceded,3 that thing alone is spoken of as Man's work: such is the meaning. Thus it has been remarked p. 351 that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unpreceded by thought. Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work.2

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   b. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences,1 the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge.2 To this he replies:

   Aph. 51.* They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly].

   a. That is to say: the authoritativeness5 of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth, but quite 'spontaneously;' because, as for the Vedas' 'own,' i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations6 [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical p. 353 Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyáya [Book II., § 681]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture,' &c.

   b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,' there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the Existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]:

   Aph. 52.* There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man's horn.

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   a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning.

   b. But then, [interposes the Naiyáyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies:

   Aph. 53.* It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities].

   a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognizance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted p. 355 to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system], &c.

   b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be different both from real and from unreal; nevertheless, the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26,] is untenable. To this he replies:

   Aph. 54.* It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]; because there exists no such thing.

   a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing; 'because there. exists no such thing,' i.e., because nothing is known other than what exists, or what does not exist: such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen.

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   b. But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyáya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise,' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, 'No':

   Aph. 55.* There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive.

   a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; 'because your own proposition is self-destructive.'4 Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth; both a man's horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own p. 357 proposition is self-destructive. For even those who contend for 'cognizing otherwise' [as one mode of cognition,] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible. Such is the meaning.2

   b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26,] 'not absolute debarment,' he sums up his doctrine:

   Aph. 56.* They [the Qualities,] are cognized rightly or wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise].

   a. All the Qualities, &c., 'are cognized rightly and p. 358 wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their existing at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c., [which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent].

   b. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end; [the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]:

   Aph. 57.* A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (sphoṭa); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary p. 359 thing,] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it].

   a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression;'1 just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyas assert, in opposition to the Yogas,] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression'? For,] by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning.

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   b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted1 before, [under § 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters:

   Aph. 58.* Sound is not eternal; because we perceive it to be made.

   a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mímánsakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that 'This is that same G'; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that '[the sound of] G has been produced': such is the meaning. And the recognition p. 361 has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized.

   b. He ponders a doubt:

   Aph. 59.* [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds,] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp.

   a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was 'previously settled,' the manifestation, through noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, 'as of a jar by a lamp.'

p. 362

   b. He repels this:

   Aph. 60.* If the dogma of products' being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved.

   a. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future,] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I., § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory,] that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory,] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import.3

   b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced, [having been already handled under Book I., § 149].

   Aph. 61.* Non-duality of Soul2 is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs.

   a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another not does quit it, &c.

   b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul only,'4 'All this is Brahma only:'6

p. 364

   Aph. 62.* Moreover, there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul; because this is disproved by sense-evidence.

   a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis,] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web].

   b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established:

   Aph. 63.* Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul, is there non-difference]; for that same [couple of reasons].

   a. 'Between the two,' i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference; p. 365 for the couple of reaaons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.

   b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, '[All] this is Soul only?' To this he replies:

   Aph. 64.* There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating.

   a. That is to say: 'in respect of the undiscriminating,' with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case or non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is 'there for the sake of something else;' i.e., the observation3 is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent; p. 366 [and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it].

   b. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Non-duality [of soul], there can be no material cause of the world, either:

   Aph. 65.* Neither soul, nor Ignorance,2 nor both, can be the material cause of the world; because of the solitariness of [Soul].

   a. The soul alone, or Ignorance lodged in the soul, or both together, like a pair of jar-halves [conjoined in the formation of a jar], cannot be the material of the world; 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction p. 367 which is called 'association;' hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply 'because of the solitariness.' Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul, [for which you Vedántís contend].

   b. He himself [in Book I., § 145] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the primâ facie view, founded on the text, 'Brahma p. 368 is reality, knowledge, and joy,'1 that the essence of the soul is joy, also:

   Aph. 66.* The two natures, joy and knowledge do not belong to one; because the two are different.

   a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning.

   b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul,] consists of joy? To this he replies:

p. 369

   Aph. 67.* Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain.

   a. That is to say: the word 'joy,' in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], 'Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.'

   b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment:

   Aph. 68.* It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull.

   a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to 'the dull,' i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;4 [for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain].

   b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already p. 370 declared,1 of the internal organ, he repels the primâ facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading.

   Aph. 69.