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211
which had anticipated the new systems in all these
directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew
their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the
Upanisads, and built their systems independently by their own
rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upanisads were
thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas,
it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp
such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to
harmonize the suggestions of the Upanisads and of the sacrificial
creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent
and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are
indeed fulfilled in the Sâmkhya philosophy, germs of which may
be discovered in the Upanisads.
The Germs of Sâmkhya in the Upanisads.
It is indeed true that in the Upanisads there is a large number
of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the
infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing
forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the
earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice,
and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result
[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upanisads this Brahman appears
as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived
their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages
for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of
development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level
in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored,
and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the
only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the
monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was
another line of thought which was developing alongside of it,
which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made
up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara
and particularly in Maitrâyanî from which it appears
that the Sâmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and
many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the
date of Maitrâyanî has not yet been definitely settled, and the details
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]
[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This
has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]
212
found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion
of the Sâmkhya thought as it developed in the Upanisads. It is
not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave
some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sâmkhya-Yoga
philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all
the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it
unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanisads with the
doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of
relativism of the Jains.
Sâmkhya and Yoga Literature.
The main exposition of the system of Sâmkhya and Yoga in
this section has been based on the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_, the _Sâmkhya
sűtras_, and the _Yoga sűtras_ of Patańjali with their commentaries
and sub-commentaries. The _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ (about
200 A.D.) was written by Îs'varakrsna. The account of Sâmkhya
given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and
this has been treated separately. Vâcaspati Mis'ra (ninth century
A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudî_. But
before him Gaudapâda and Râjâ wrote commentaries on the
_Sâmkhya kârikâ_ [Footnote ref 1]. Nârâyanatîrtha wrote his _Candrikâ_
on
Gaudapâda's commentary. The _Sâmkhya sűtras_ which have been commented
on by Vijńâna Bhiksu (called _Pravacanabhâsya_) of the
sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author
after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the
fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_. Vijńâna Bhiksu wrote also another elementary
work on Sâmkhya known as _Sâmkhyasâra_. Another short work
of late origin is _Tattvasamâsa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two
other works on Sâmkhya, viz Sîmânanda's _Sâmkhyatattvavivecana_
and Bhâvâganes'a's _Sâmkhyatattvayâthârthyadîpana_ (both later
than Vijńânabhiksu) of real philosophical value have also been
freely consulted. Patańjali's _Yoga sűtra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.)
was commented on by Vâysa (400 A.D.) and Vyâsa's bhâsya
commented on by Vâcaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'âradî_,
by Vijńâna Bhiksu _Yogavârttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century
_Bhojavrtti_, and by Nâges'a (seventeenth century) _Châyâvyâkhyâ_.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I suppose that Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_ was the
same
as _Râjavârttika_ quoted by Vâcaspati. Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_
has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamańjarî_, p. 109. This book
is probably now lost.]
213
Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may
mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories
of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_
by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published
by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation
to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published,
and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication
with the Calcutta University.
Gunaratna mentions two other authoritative Sâmkhya works,
viz. _Mâtharabhâsya_ and _Âtreyatantra_. Of these the second is
probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sâmkhya, for we know
that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it
was called Âtreyasamhitâ or Âtreyatantra. Nothing is known
of the Mâtharabhâsya [Footnote ref 1].
An Early School of Sâmkhya.
It is important for the history of Sâmkhya philosophy that
Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been
dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sâmkhya, should
be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy.
According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhâtus_), viz. the
five elements such as âkâs'a, vâyu etc. and cetanâ, called also
purusa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to
be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five
conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold
prakrti (prakrti, mahat, ahamkâra and the five elements)[Footnote ref
2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence
is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses
there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with
them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate
sensing (_űha_) and conceiving (_vicâra_) before definite understanding
(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the
combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with
a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sâmkhya-Yoga may omit the following
three sections at the time of first reading.]
[Footnote 2: Purua is here excluded from the list. Cakrapâni, the
commentator, says that the prakrti and purusa both being unmanifested,
the two together have been counted as one. _Prakrtivyatiriktańcodâsînam
purusamavyaktatvasâdharmyât avyaktâyâm prakrtâveva praksipya
avyaktas'avbdenaiva grhnâti._ Harinâtha Vis'ârada's edition of
_Caraka, S'ârîra_, p. 4.]
214
of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with
a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance
of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmâtras at all [Footnote ref 1].
The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) or gross matter,
the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhűtas and prakrti, mahat
and ahamkâra taking place through rajas make up what we call
man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases.
All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance,
life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also
the purusa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death,
bondage, or salvation. If the âtman were not regarded as cause,
all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one
others would be responsible. This purusa, called also _paramâtman_,
is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in
itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it
through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By
ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of purusa
and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action,
cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects
are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but
all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which
is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the
avyakta part of prakrti with purusa as forming one category.
The vikâra or evolutionary products of prakrti are called ksetra,
whereas the avyakta part of prakrti is regarded as the ksetrajńa
(_avyaktamasya ksetrasya ksetrajńamrsayo viduh_). This avyakta
and cetanâ are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested
prakrti or cetanâ is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is
derived the ego (_ahamkâra_) and from the ahamkâra the five
elements and the senses are produced, and when this production
is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time
of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return
back to prakrti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the
time of a new creation from the purusa the unmanifest (_avyakta_),
all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, ahamkâra,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter,
is referred to as forming part of _prakrti_ which is regarded as having
eight elements in it _prakrtis'castadhâtuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat,
ahamkâra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming
part of the prakrti we hear of indriyârthâ, the five sense objects
which have evolved out of the prakrti.]
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215
etc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of
dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and
tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer
this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in
association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself
takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish,
undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will
and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive,
yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are
associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains
are felt by the conglomeration (_râs'i_), and not by the âtman presiding
over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and
pain comes desire (_trsnâ_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and
from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Moksa means complete
cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association
of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the
manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when
there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns
that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves,
but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do
not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last
renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally
extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence
of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote
ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this
state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any
characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sâmkhyas as their
goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are
rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be
enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary
previous to Cakrapâni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve
back into the prakrti--the purusa--and at the time of rebirth they
become manifest again. See Cakrapâni on s'ârîra, I. 46.]
[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhűta, it is not in any
sense like the Brahman of Vedânta which is of the nature of pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like
absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alaksanam_),
resembling Nâgârjuna's Nirvâna. Thus Caraka
writes:--_tasmims'caramasannyâse saműlâhhsarvavedanâh
asamjńâjńânavijńânâ nivrttim yântyas'esatah. atahparam
brahmabhűto bhűtâtmâ nopalabhyate nihsrtah sarvabhâvebhyah cihnam
yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidâm brahma taccâksaramalaksanam. Caraka,
S'ârîra_ 1. 98-100.]
216
the state of moksa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours
in the shape of association with good people, abandoning
of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed
attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)
thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and
this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self.
As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or
character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation
(_mokse nivrttirnihs'esâ_).
The main features of the Sâmkhya doctrine as given by Caraka
are thus: 1. Purusa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera
of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed
which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmâtras are
not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of
the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of
emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute
existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is
no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the
conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, ahamkâra etc.
6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).
This account of Sâmkhya agrees with the system of Sâmkhya
propounded by Pańcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of
Âsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the
Mahâbhârata XII. 219. Pańcas'ikha of course does not describe
the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what
little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sâmkhya
he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pańcas'ikha
speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all
Sâmkhya literature to prakrti) in the state of purusa
(_purusâvasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination
of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases
with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a
discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as
the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility.
The same discussion occurs in Pańcas'ikha also, and the proofs
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:
(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect,
(2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to
remember.]
[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty
in accepting Pańcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sâmkhya doctrine.
This may probably be due to the fact that the Sâmkhya doctrines sketched
in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]
217
for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again
Pańcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Moksa
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these
phenomena. The gunas described by Pańcas'ikha are the different
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it.
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the ksetra, as
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose
themselves in the ocean and it is called alinga (without any
characteristic)--a term reserved for prakrti in later Sâmkhya.
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation
which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction
(_samyagbadha_).
Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of
_Saddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sâmkhya, the
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these
the doctrine of the Maulikya Sâmkhya is said to be that which
believed that there was a separate pradhâna for each âtman
(_maulikyasâmkhyâ hyâtmânamâtmânam prati prthak pradhânam
vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sâmkhya doctrine
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sâmkhya.
In _Mahâbhârata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sâmkhya are
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five
(the well-known orthodox Sâmkhya system) and those who
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a
supreme being in addition to purusa and this was the twenty-sixth
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the
form of Sâmkhya advocated in the _Mahâbhârata_. The schools of
Sâmkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of
Sâmkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Gunaratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 99.]
218
other chapters of the _Mahâbhârata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self
apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon
day; it is said that as Râhu (the shadow on the sun during an
eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be
seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'arîrinah_) are spoken of as
manifesting from prakrti.
We do not know anything about Âsuri the direct disciple
of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of
Sâmkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same
form in the _Mahâbhârata_ and has been attributed there to Pańcas'ikha
is probably the earliest form of Sâmkhya available to us
in a systematic form. Not only does Gunaratna's reference to the
school of Maulikya Sâmkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka
(78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sâmkhya as described by Îs'varakrsna
and referred to in other parts of _Mahâbhârata_ is a definite
proof that Îs'varakrsna's Sâmkhya is a later modification, which
was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as
an authoritative old Sâmkhya view.
Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavâsin altered
the Sâmkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks
that Vindhyavâsin was a title of Îs'varakrsna [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe
holds that the date of Îs'varakrsna was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a
very plausible view that Îs'varakrsna was indebted for his kârikâs to
another work, which was probably written in a style different
from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Kârikâ_ seems to
be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Âsuri is quoted by Gunaratna
(_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when
buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (purusa) has experience.
It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]
[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]
[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramârtha's life of
Vasubandhu," _J.
R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be
extremely doubtful, for Gunaratna mentions Îs'varakrsna and
Vindhyavâsin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_
pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavâsin (p. 104) in
anustubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Îs'varakrsnâ. It
appears that Îs'varakrsna wrote two books; one is the _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ and another an independent work on Sâmkhya, a line from which,
quoted by Gunaratna, stands as follows:
"_Pratiniyatâdhyavasâyah s'rotrâdisamuttha adhyaksam_" (p.
108).
If Vâcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumâna in his
_Tattvakaumudî_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ then Îs'varakrsna must be a different person from Vindhyavâsin
whose views on anumâna as referred to in _S'lokavârttika,_ p. 393, are
altogether different. But Vâcaspati's own statement in the
_Tâtparyyatîkâ_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not
faithful.]
219
_Mahâbhâsya_ of Patańjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1].
The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which
frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned
with the strictly technical part of Sâmkhya, and it is just possible
that the book from which Patańjali quoted the passage, and which
was probably paraphrased in the Âryâ metre by Îs'varakrsna
was not a Sâmkhya book at all. But though the subject of the
verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sâmkhya, yet
since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of
Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard
against certain objections against the Sâmkhya doctrine of
prakrti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the
verse of a Sâmkhya book which was paraphrased by Îs'varakrsna.
The earliest descriptions of a Sâmkhya which agrees with
Îs'varakrsna's Sâmkhya (but with an addition of Îs'vara) are to be
found in Patańjali's _Yoga sűtras_ and in the _Mahâbhârata;_ but we
are pretty certain that the Sâmkhya of Caraka we have sketched
here was known to Patańjali, for in _Yoga sűtra_ I. 19 a reference is
made to a view of Sâmkhya similar to this.
From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sâmkhya
of Caraka and Pańcas'ikha is very important; for it shows a
transitional stage of thought between the Upanisad ideas and
the orthodox Sâmkhya doctrine as represented by Îs'varakrsna.
On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and
that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that
the purusa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyâya,
and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer
than the orthodox Sâmkhya.
We hear of a _Sastitantras'âstra_ as being one of the oldest Sâmkhya
works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ as
containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote
ref 2]. A quotation from _Râjavârttika_ (a work about which there is no
definite information) in Vâcaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sâmkhya
kârika_(72) says that it was called the _Sastitantra because
it dealt with the existence of prakrti, its oneness, its difference
from purusas, its purposefulness for purusas, the multiplicity of
purusas, connection and separation from purusas, the evolution of
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Patańjali's Mahâbhâsya, IV. I. 3.
_Atisannikarsâdativiprakarsât műrttyantaravyavadhânât
tamasâvrtatvât indriyadaurvalyâdatipramâdât,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]
[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ,_ pp. 108, 110.]
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220
the categories, the inactivity of the purusas and the five _viparyyayas_,
nine tustis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the
eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].
But the content of the _Sastitantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya
Samhitâ_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sâmkhya
of the _Sastitantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ was of
a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pańcarâtra
Vaisnavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ says that Kapila's
theory of Sâmkhya was a Vaisnava one. Vijńâna Bhiksu, the
greatest expounder of Sâmkhya, says in many places of his work
_Vijńânâmrta Bhâsya_ that Sâmkhya was originally theistic, and that
the atheistic Sâmkhya is only a _praudhivâda_ (an exaggerated
attempt to show that no supposition of Îs'vara is necessary to
explain the world process) though the _Mahâbhârata_ points out
that the difference between Sâmkhya and Yoga is this, that the
former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy
between the two accounts of _Sastitantra_ suggests that the original
_Sastitantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Samhitâ_ was
subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is
corroborated by the fact that Gunaratna does not mention among
the important Sâmkhya works _Sastitantra_ but _Sastitantroddhâra_
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs,
and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karikâ_ of Is'varakrsna, but I
have omitted them in my account of Sâmkhya as these have little
philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five,
viz. avidyâ (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa
(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo,
moha, mahâmoha, tamisrâ_, and _andhatâmisra_. These are of nine kinds
of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prakrti
will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary
to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's
life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time
(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhâgya_), and
the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of
causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of
protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things
earned by enjoyment (_parâpara_), increase of desires leading to greater
disappointments (_anuttamâmbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others
(_uttamâmbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations
with those who consider prakrti and its evolutes as the self. The
siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of
scriptures (_târa_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutâra_),
(3) proper reasoning (_târatâra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas
with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field
(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice
(_sadâmudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and
modamâna lead directly to the separation of the prakrti from the purus'a.
The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses
and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the
absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tustis
and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the
achievement of the Sâmkhya goal.]
221
(revised edition of _Sastitantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the
earlier Sastitantra was lost even before Vâcaspati's time.
If we believe the Sastitantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya
Samhitâ_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was
composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it
has to be assumed that Kapila's Sâmkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It
seems probable that his disciple Âsuri tried to popularise it. But it
seems that a great change occurred when Pańcas'ikha the disciple of
Âsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It
is said in _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ (70) that the literature was divided by
him into many parts (_tena bahudhâkrtam tantram_). The exact
meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that
the original _Sastitantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises.
It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vaisnavas
accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential
parts as the Sâmkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption
that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are
a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the
Pâtańjala Sâmkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may
be ventured is that Pańcas'ikha probably modified Kapila's
work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this
supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of
Sâmkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but
which is kept in a modified form by the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya,
second an atheistic one as represented by Pańcas'ikha, and
a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sâmkhya system.
An important change in the Sâmkhya doctrine seems to have
been introduced by Vijńâna Bhiksu (sixteenth century A.D.) by his
treatment of gunas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this
interpretation of Sâmkhya as the most rational and philosophical
one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system
of the accepted Kapila and the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya. But
it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gunas was
applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then
they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase
and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 109.]
[Footnote 2: _evam sadvims'akam prâhah s'arîramth mânavâh sâmkhyam
samkhyâtmakatvâcca kapilâdibhirucyate. Matsyapurâna_, IV. 28.]
222
totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation
of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijńâna Bhiksu
and the Vaisnava writer Venkata [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga
philosophy compiled by Patańjali and commented on by Vyâsa,
Vâcaspati and Vijńana Bhiksu, agree with the Sâmkhya doctrine
as explained by Vâcaspati and Vijńana Bhiksu in most points I
have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pâtańjala schools
of Sâmkhya and have treated them together--a principle which
was followed by Haribhadra in his _Saddars'anasamuaccaya_.
The other important Sâmkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapâda
are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanâtana and Vodhu. Nothing is
known about their historicity or doctrines.
Sâmkhya kârikâ, Sâmkhya sűtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and
Vijńâna Bhiksu.
A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation
of the Sâmkhya-Yoga system. The _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ is
the oldest Sâmkhya text on which we have commentaries by
later writers. The _Sâmkhya sűtra_ was not referred to by any
writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth
century A.D.). Even Gunaratna of the fourteenth century A D. who
made allusions to a number of Sâmkhya works, did not make any
reference to the _Sâmkhya sűtra_, and no other writer who is known
to have flourished before Gunaratna seems to have made any
reference to the _Sâmkhya sűtra_. The natural conclusion therefore
is that these sűtras were probably written some time after
the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to
prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is
said at the end of the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_ of Îs'varakrsna that the
kârikâs give an exposition of the Sâmkhya doctrine excluding
the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the
parables attached to the original Sâmkhya works--the
_Sastitantras'âstra_. The _Sâmkhya sűtras_ contain refutations
of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable
that these were collected from some earlier Sâmkhya work which is
now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition
of the _Sastitantras'âstra_ (_Sastitantroddhâra_ as mentioned by
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Venkata's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume
of the present work.]
223
Gűnaratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to
suppose that the Sâmkhya doctrine found in the sűtras differs in
any important way from the Sâmkhya doctrine as found in the
_Sâmkhya kârikâ_. The only point of importance is this, that the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_ hold that when the Upanisads spoke of one absolute
pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved
in the class of intelligent purusas as distinct from the class of
the gunas. As all purusas were of the nature of pure intelligence,
they were spoken of in the Upanisads as one, for they all form
the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some
sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in
the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_. This is, however, a case of omission and not
of difference. Vijńâna Bhiksu, the commentator of the _Sâmkhya
sűtra_, was more inclined to theistic Sâmkhya or Yoga than
to atheistic Sâmkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in
his _Sâmkhyapravacanabhâsya, Yogavârttika_, and _Vijńânâmrtabhasya_
(an independent commentary on the Brahmasűtras of
Bâdarâyana on theistic Sâmkhya lines). Vijńâna Bhiksu's own
view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he
agreed more with the views of the Sâmkhya doctrine of the
Puranas, where both the diverse purusas and the prakrti are said
to be merged in the end in Îs'vara, by whose will the creative
process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya.
He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the
_Sâmkhya sűtras_, but he remarked that these were used only with
a view to showing that the Sâmkhya system gave such a rational
explanation that even without the intervention of an Îs'vara it could
explain all facts. Vijńâna Bhiksu in his interpretation of Sâmkhya
differed on many points from those of Vâcaspati, and it is difficult
to say who is right. Vijńâna Bhiksu has this advantage that
he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points
on which Vâcaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the
nature of the conception of the gunas, which I believe is the most
important thing in Sâmkhya. Vijńâna Bhiksu described the
gunas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vâcaspati and
Gaudapâda (the other commentator of the _Sâmkhya kârikâ_)
remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their
interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of
Vijńâna Bhiksu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite
explanations regarding the nature of the gunas, Bhiksu definitely
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224
came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation
of their nature.
Since no definite explanation of the gunas is found in any
other work before Bhiksu, it is quite probable that this matter
may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka
nor the _Mahâbhârata_ explains the nature of the gunas. But
Bhiksu's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known
of the manifestations and the workings of the gunas in all early
documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhiksu
in giving my account of the nature of the gunas. The _Kârikâ_
speaks of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as
being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and
causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vâcaspati
merely paraphrases this statement of the _Kârikâ_ but does not enter
into any further explanations. Bhiksu's interpretation fits in well
with all that is known of the gunas, though it is quite possible
that this view might not have been known before, and when the
original Sâmkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness
as to the conception of the gunas.
There are some other points in which Bhiksu's interpretation
differs from that of Vâcaspati. The most important of these may
be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of
the buddhi states with the purusa. Vâcaspati holds that there is
no contact (_samyoga_) of any buddhi state with the purusa but that
a reflection of the purusa is caught in the state of buddhi by
virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed
into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection
that it does not explain how the purusa can be said to be the
experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection
in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience
(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any
actual connection of the purusa with the buddhi. The answer of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space
and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific
kind of fitness (_yogyatâ_) by virtue of which the purusa, though it
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi,
and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed
to a person. Vijńâna Bhiksu differs from Vâcaspati and says that
if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no
225
reason why purusa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time
of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all,
for the fitness being in the purusa, he could not be divested of it,
and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in
the buddhi for ever. Vijńana Bhiksu thus holds that there is a
real contact of the purusa with the buddhi state in any cognitive
state. Such a contact of the purusa and the buddhi does not
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on
account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change
means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers
changes, and when these changes are reflected in the purusa, there
is the notion of a person or experiencer in the purusa, and when
the purusa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears
as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between
Vâcaspati and Bhiksu as regards the nature of the perceptual
process. Bhiksu thinks that the senses can directly perceive the
determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas,
whereas Vâcaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the
sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate
sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is
the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at
the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association
by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified
by the activity of manas called samkalpa which coordinates the
indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and
conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics.
Bhiksu who supposes that the determinate character of things is
directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate
position to manas as being only the faculty of desire,
doubt, and imagination.
It may not be out of place to mention here that there are
one or two passages in Vâcaspati's commentary on the _Sâmkhya
kârikâ_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_ahamkâra_)
as producing the subjective series of the senses and the
objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will,
but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not
necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view
with regard to the evolution of the tanmâtras from the mahat;
for contrary to the view of _Vyâsabhâsya_ and Vijńâna Bhiksu etc.
Vâcaspati holds that from the mahat there was ahamkâra and
226
from ahamkâra the tanmâtras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijńâna Bhiksu however
holds that both the separation of ahamkâra and the evolution of the
tanmâtras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more
reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some
other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between
Vâcaspati and Bhiksu which are not of much philosophical
importance.
Yoga and Patańjali.
The word yoga occurs in the Rg-Veda in various senses such
as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection,
and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the
other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was
used in this sense in Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as
the S'atapatha Brâhmana and the Brhadâranyaka Upanisad [Footnote ref 2].
The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature
[Footnote ref 3].
With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the
Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very
much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow
of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues
and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].
As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force
of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of
a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally
applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control
of the senses [Footnote ref 5].
In Pânini's time the word yoga had attained its technical
meaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samâdhau_" (_yuj_
in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ in
the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as
a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological
derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]
[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114.
9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahmana 14. 7. I. II.]
[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German
Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]
[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; Brh. I. 2. 6; Brh. III. 8. 10;
Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brâh, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;
S'atap. Brâh. XI. 5. 8. 1.]
[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriyâni hayânâhuh visayâtesugocarân_.
The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.
Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriyânyasya hayâh_ the conative senses are its
horses.]
[Footnote 6: _Yugyah_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from
_yuja samâdhau_. A consideration of Panini's rule "Tadasya
brahmacaryam,"
V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which
passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time
(Pânini as Goldstűcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with
these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by
the name of Yoga.]
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227
In the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, we find that the word yoga has been
used not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samâdhau_" but
also with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusion
to the readers of the _Bhagavadgîtâ._ "Yogin" in the sense
of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded
with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of
this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ tried to mark out a
middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction
on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action
of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently
from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the
best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet
abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.
Kautilya in his _Arthas'âstra_ when enumerating the philosophic
sciences of study names Sâmkhya, Yoga, and Lokâyata. The
oldest Buddhist sűtras (e.g. the _Satipatthâna sutta_) are fully
familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus
infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical
method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.
As regards the connection of Yoga with Sâmkhya, as we find
it in the _Yoga sűtras_ of Patańjali, it is indeed difficult to come to
any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted
notice in many of the earlier Upanisads, though there had not
probably developed any systematic form of prânâyâma (a system
of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we
come to Maitrâyanî that we find that the Yoga method had attained
a systematic development. The other two Upanisads in
which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetâs'vatara and
the Katha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three
Upanisads of Krsna Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga
methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to
the Sâmkhya tenets, though the Sâmkhya and Yoga ideas do not
appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of
the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the
Maitrâyanî in the conversation between S'âkyâyana and Brhad
ratha where we find that the Sâmkhya metaphysics was offered
228
in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes,
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the
Sâmkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently
systematized by Patańjali. Thus S'âkyâyana says: "Here some
say it is the guna which through the differences of nature goes
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief,
certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating
he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave,
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man
stand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness.
All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a
verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called
the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"
An examination of such Yoga Upanisads as S'ândilya, Yogatattva,
Dhyânabindu, Hamsa, Amrtanâda, Varâha, Mandala
Brâhmana, Nâdabindu, and Yogakundalű, shows that the Yoga
practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but
none of these show any predilection for the Sâmkhya. Thus the
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana, however, in his bhâsya on _Nyâya sűtra_, I. i
29,
distinguishes Sâmkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sâmkhya holds
that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any
change in the pure intelligence (_niratis'ayâh cetanâh_). All changes
are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects.
Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the purusa.
Dosas (passions) and the pravrtti (action) are the cause of karma.
The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non
being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last
view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyâsabhâsya,_ It is
closer to Nyâya in its doctrines. If Vâtsyâyana's statement is correct,
it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in
creation was borrowed by Sâmkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the
same sűtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sâmkhya
and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika._"
Curiously
enough Vâtsyâyana quotes a passage from _Vyâsabhâsya,_ III. 13, in his
bhâsya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]
229
S'aivas and S'aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;
they grew in another direction as the Hathayoga which
was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through
constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also
associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The
Yogatattva Upanisad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the
Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Hathayoga and Râjayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some
cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedântism
with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in
the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also
very great, but we have to leave out these from our present
consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as
they are not connected with our present endeavour.
Of the Pâtańjala school of Sâmkhya, which forms the subject of
the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patańjali was probably
the most notable person for he not only collected the different
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which
were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all
on the Sâmkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which
they have been handed down to us. Vâcaspati and Vijńâna
Bhiksu, the two great commentators on the _Vyâsabhâsya_, agree
with us in holding that Patańjali was not the founder of Yoga,
but an editor. Analytic study of the sűtras brings the conviction
that the sűtras do not show any original attempt, but a
masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented
by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also
in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition
and classification shows that the materials were already in
existence and that Patańjali systematized them. There was
no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of
other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of
explaining the system. Patańjal is not even anxious to establish
the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts
as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists
occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are
described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated
from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigîsavya wrote
"_Dhâranâs'âstra_" which
dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patańjali.
He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the
nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory
where concentration is to be made. See Vâcaspati's _Tâtparyatîkâ_ or
Vâtsyâyana's bhâsya on _Nyâya sűtra_, III. ii. 43.]
230
criticized; the putting of an "_iti_" (the word to denote the
conclusion
of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course
another "_iti_" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a
hand other than that of Patańjali who was anxious to supply
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last
chapter as compared with the style of the other three.
The sűtras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the
topics introduced are such that they could well have been
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sűtras,
whereas the average number of sűtras in other chapters is between
51 to 55.
We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date
of this famous Yoga author Patańjali. Weber had tried to connect
him with Kâpya Patamchala of S'atapatha Brâhmana [Footnote ref l]; in
Kâtyâyana's _Varttika_ we get the name Patańjali which is explained
by later commentators as _patantah ańjalayah yasmai_ (for
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of
names. There is however another theory which identifies the
writer of the great commentary on Pânini called the _Mahâbhâsya_
with the Patańjali of the _Yoga sűtra_. This theory has been
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of
some Indian commentators who identified the two Patańjalis.
Of these one is the writer of the _Patańjalicarita_ (Râmabhadra
Dîksîta) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth
century. The other is that cited in S'ivarâma's commentary on
_Vâsavadattâ_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century.
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhâr and Cakrapânidatta,
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]
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the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh
century A.D. Thus Cakrapâni says that he adores the Ahipati
(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech
and body by his _Pâtańjala mahâbhâsya_ and the revision of
_Caraka._ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of
that illustrious sovereign Ranaranigamalla who by composing his
grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patańjala and by
producing a treatise on medicine called _Râjamrgânka_ has like the
lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech,
mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyâsa (which is considered
to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also
based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that
the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion
between the three Patańjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor,
and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as
_Pâtańjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in his
commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of
metals.
Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore
in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian
and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these
commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great
commentators of the grammar school such as Bhartrhari, Kaiyyata,
Vâmana, Jayâditya, Nâges'a, etc. are silent on this point.
This is indeed a point against the identification of the two
Patańjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later
age. And if other proofs are available which go against such
an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the
Yoga writer to be the same person.
Let us now see if Patańjali's grammatical work contains anything
which may lead us to think that he was not the same
person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the
philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patańjalis
differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that
dravya is described in _Vyâsabhâsya_ in one place as being the
unity of species and qualities (_sâmânyavis'esâtmaka_), whereas
the _Mahâbhâsya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also
specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on
either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally
antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by
232
Vyâdi and Vâjapyâyana (Vyâdi holding that words denoted
qualities or dravya and Vâjapyâyana holding that words denoted
species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pânini had these two different ideas in
"_jâtyâkhyâyâmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyâm_" and
"_sarűpânamekas'esamekavibhaktau_," and Patańjali the writer of
the _Mahâbhâsya_ only combined these two views. This does not show
that he opposes the view of _Vyâsabhâsya_, though we must remember
that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard
to the writer of the sűtras. Moreover, when we read that dravya
is spoken of in the _Mahâbhâsya_ as that object which is the
specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is
of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat
sâsnâlângulakakudakhuravisânyartharűpam_," we are reminded of
its similarity with "_ayutasiddhâvayavabhedânugatah saműhah
dravyam_"
(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the
_Vyâsabhâsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahâbhâsya_ I have
not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us
in holding that the two Patańjalis cannot be identified. There
are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even
in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians
that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable
for us to judge anything about the personal views
of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the
writer of the _Mahâbhâsya_ knew most of the important points of
the Sâmkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer
to the guna theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sâmkhya dictum of ex
nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the
idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of
change _vikâra_ as production of new qualities _gunântarâdhâna_
(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133).
We may add to it that the _Mahâbhâsya_ agrees with the Yoga
view as regards the Sphotavâda, which is not held in common
by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this
external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin
their works in a similar manner (_atha yogânus'âsanam_ and
_athas'âbdânus'âsanam_)--"now begins the compilation of the
instructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sűtrâ_)--and "now begins the
compilation
of the instructions of words" (_Mahâbhâsya_).
It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Patańjali's _Mahâbhâsya,_ 1. 2. 64.]
233
which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the
_Yoga sűtra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive,
as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patańjalis
cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the
Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed
Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which,
as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they
were written by Patańjali it cannot be inferred that because
Vâcaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijńâna-vâdi
type, we are to infer that the sűtras refer to Vasubandhu or
even to Nâgârjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sűtras
had been developing long before the time of Nâgârjuna.
Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators
may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two
Patańjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative
critical study of the _Yoga sűtras_ and the text of the _Mahâbhâsya,_
which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga
sűtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patańjali.
Postponing our views about the time of Patańjali the Yoga
editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing
the other work _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for
our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous
one and he translates it along with another book called _Sânka_
(Sâmkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the
form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that
this book was not the present _Yoga sűtra_ of Patańjali, though it
had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation
and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation.
The book was called by Alberuni _Kitâb Pâtanjal_, which is to
be translated as the book of Pâtańjala, because in another place,
speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when
translated stands as "the author of the book of Pâtanjal." It
had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes
many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It
treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in
the _Yoga sűtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist
reference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramânakam tadâ kim syât_
(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyâsabhâsya, as Bhoja, who had
consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count
it as sűtra.]
234
far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by
Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change
from what we find in the _Yoga sűtra_. Following the idea of God
in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless
emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and
shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they
could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name
of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of
which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives
him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical
with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it
uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption
with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].
The idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga sűtra._
The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the
eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation
on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation
corresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yoga
sűtra._ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation,
of which the first is the _abhyâsa_ (habit) of Patańjali, and the
object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second
stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek
his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga sűtra,_ I. 23 and
I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana
or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the
same as in the _Yoga sűtra,_ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated
state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being
one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvaműla
avâks'âkha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branches
below), after the Upanisad fashion, the upper root is pure
Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different
doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of
interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga sűtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sűtras_
speak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated purusa, omniscient,
and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the
obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice
are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of
concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object,
for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills
that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No
argument is given in the _Yoga sűtras_ of the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]
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235
object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the
roots.
The difference of this system from that of the _Yoga sűtra_ is:
(1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance
that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption
in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and
the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the
Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any
connection with God as we find in the _Yoga sűtra_ has been lost
sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in
God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance
of Yoga as control of mental states (_cittarttinirodha_) is lost
sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the
means of salvation.
From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification
of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patańjali's _Yoga sűtra_ in
the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it
probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga
doctrine of the sűtras entered into a new channel in such a way
that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments
of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author
mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable
that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same
person who wrote _Pâtańjala tantra_, who has been quoted by
S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of
by Nâges'a as "_Carake_ Patańjalih." We can also assume with some
degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that
Cakrapani and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with
the writer of the _Mahâbhâsya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâni
by his line "_pâtańjalamahâbhâsyacarakapratisamskrtaih_"
refers to this work which was called "Pâtańjala." The commentator
of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and
the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the
_Vyâsabhâsya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably
written at a time when the _Vyâsabhâsya_ was not written
or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâmkhya, gives
a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama,
but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]
[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of _Pâs'upatadars'ana_ in
_Sarvadas'anasamgraha_.]
236
also described the book as being very famous at the time, and
Bhoja and Cakrapâni also probably confused him with Patańjali
the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book
of Patańjali was probably written by some other Patańjali within
the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not
be improbable that when _Vyâsabhâsya_ quotes in III. 44 as "_iti_
Patańjalih," he refers to this Patańjali.
The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâyana
Upanisad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely prânâyâma,
pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dharanâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1].
Comparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga sűtras_ we find
that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been
replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two
heresies given in the _Brahmajâla sutta_ we know that there were
people who either from meditation of three degrees or through
logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external
world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the
association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi
or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called
s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an anga in
samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the angas given in
Maitrâyanî Upanisad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine,
when the Sâmkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being
grafted on each other, and when the Samkhya method of discussion
did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The
substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patańjali shows that
the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Samkhya.
The introduction of ahimsâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness),
asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha
(want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santosa (contentment)
as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is
deemed impossible (for the first time in the sűtras), probably
marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the
Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî,
karunâ, muditâ, upeksâ is also equally significant, as we do not
find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other
literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation.
Beginning from the _Âcârângasűtra, Uttarâdhyayanasűtra_,
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _prânâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dharanâ tarkah
samâdhih
sadanga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8).]
237
the _Sűtrakrtângasűtra,_ etc., and passing through Umâsvati's
_Tattvârthâdhigamasűtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'âstra_ we find that
the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the
basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the
opinion expressed in Alberuni's _Pâtanjal_ that these cannot give
salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from
the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its
thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection
with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the
same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely
suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the
path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics
of the samsâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination,
decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of
similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism.
Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should
not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'ankara, as it is an
avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion
nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the
range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance
of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sűtra
"_anityâs'uciduhkhânâtmasu nityas'uciduhkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ_"
(II. 5).
The ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_).
"This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be
ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds
of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts
off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of
Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in
the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has
never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu
literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things
in this section is to show that the _Yoga sűtras_ proper (first three
chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of
Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between
the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Yoga sűtra,_ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathâcikitsâs'âstram
caturvyűham rogo rogahetuh ârogyam bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi
s'âstram caturvyűhameva; tadyathâ samsârah, samsârahetuh moksah
moksopâyah; duhkhabahulah samsâro heyah, pradhânapurusayoh
samyogo heyahetuh, samyogasyâtyantikî nivrttirhânam hanopâyah
samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâsya_, II. 15]
[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1].]
238
a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another.
As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed
to think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yoga
sűtras_ must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there
is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the
grammarian Patańjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may
take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].
The Sâmkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusa.
The Sâmkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles,
souls and _prakrti_, the root principle of matter. Souls are
many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities.
They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a
smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are
not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But
the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it
and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the
mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are
many, and had it not been so (the Sâmkhya argues) with the
birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one
all would have died [Footnote ref 2].
The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension,
and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly
grasp in order to understand the Sâmkhya philosophy. Unlike
the Jaina soul possessing _anantajńâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_,
and _anantavîryya_, the Sâmkhya soul is described as being
devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute
pure consciousness (_cit_). The Sâmkhya view differs from
the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to
be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_ânanda_) [Footnote ref
3]. Bliss with Sâmkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it
belongs to prakrti and does not constitute the nature of soul;
secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (_Jîva_) are
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other
Indian systems of thought,_ ch. II. The most important point in favour
of this identification seems to be that both the Patańjalis as against
the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _sphota_ which was
denied even by Sâmkhya. On the doctrine of Sphota see my _Study
of Patanjali_, Appendix I.]
[Footnote 2: _Kârikâ_, 18.]
[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradîpikâ,_ IV.]
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239
but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the
Brahman, but according to Sâmkhya they are all real and many.
The most interesting feature of Sâmkhya as of Vedânta is
the analysis of knowledge. Sâmkhya holds that our knowledge
of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things
are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind,
the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in
some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature
like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go,
they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things,
and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material,
but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest.
These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious,
if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection
with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted
as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the
Upanisads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite
consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas,
and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not
detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle
which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which
illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes.
The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self"
but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other
things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The
Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and
every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the
veil. Sâmkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image
of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent
principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle
matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms
or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance,
and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed
in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves,
the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated.
So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic
of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would
be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumudî_ 5; _Yogavârttika_, IV. 22;
_Vijńânâmrtabhâsya_, p. 74; _Yogavârttika_ and _Tattvavais'âradî_,
I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyâsabhâsya,_ I. 6, 7.]
240
so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the
same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens
these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious.
This principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot indeed be
separately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle in
all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference.
This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality,
no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes
place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it,
and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes
of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item
of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is
but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the
principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge
carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness,
it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness.
Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of a
particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation
of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening,
pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is
concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind
knowledge-stuff.
The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent
parts, and had held that the coming together of these
brought about the conscious states. This coming together was
to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity
or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary
collocation. With Sămkhya however the self, the pure _cit_, is
neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent.
Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements
of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise
have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into
connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted
as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and
may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the
expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to note that Sâmkhya has two terms to denote
the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of
awareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the form
of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition
takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.]
241
knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a
system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called
purusa. There is a separate purusa in Sâmkhya for each individual,
and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedânta
âtman however is different from the Sâmkhya purusa in this that
it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being,
and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory mâyâ it
appears as many.
Thought and Matter.
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are
made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter
are, why then should the purusa illuminate it and not external
material objects. The answer that Sâmkhya gives is that the
knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects
in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance
of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), which
resembles the light of purusa, and is thus fit for reflecting and
absorbing the light of the purusa. The two principal characteristics
of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it
has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed
by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has
again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able
to catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendent
principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic
of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to
both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is
at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity
of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the
intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the
gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that
thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of
thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour,
and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its
object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter
did not possess some of the essential substances of which the
copy was made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which is
so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination
in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some
such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in
242
thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have
movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images
do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent
and plastic element of thought (_sattva_) in association with
movement (_rajas_) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation
of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction
(_tamas_) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses
things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)
holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness,
and actual knowledge comes before our view as though
by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the
light of the purusa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its
stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture
or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates
that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests
itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both
thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a
plasticity of intelligence-stuff (_sattva_), energy-stuff (_rajas_), and
mass-stuff (_tamas_), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last
two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.
Feelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1].
Another question that arises in this connection is the position
of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sâmkhya
holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have
analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most
interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that
we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we
should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped
sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its
appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and
we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image.
Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of
knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down
the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of
matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling
which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale
of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there
comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling
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[Footnote 1: _Kârikâ_, 12, with Gaudpâda and Nârâyanatîrtha.]
243
reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark
the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the
point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in
ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain
stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at
a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with
matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves,
the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross
matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in
taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross
matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed
to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember
the Sâmkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and
matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances
which are in essence but three types of feeling entities.
The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we
have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations
of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings
that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that
we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither
sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression
(_visâda_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of
manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as
shining (_prakâs'a_), energy (_pravrtti_), obstruction (_niyama_), there
are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as
the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross
matter and thought by their varying modifications.
The Gunas [Footnote ref 1].
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically
called _guna_ in Sâmkhya philosophy. Guna in Sanskrit has three
meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These
entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it
may be mentioned in this connection that in Sâmkhya philosophy
there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each
and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What
we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance
of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Yogavârttika_, II. 18; Bhâvâganes'a's
_Tattvayâthârthyadîpana_, pp. 1-3; _Vijńânâmrtabhâsya_,
p. 100; _Tattvakaumudî_, 13; also Gaudapâda and Nârâyanatîrtha, 13.]
244
signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; any
object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sâmkhya
holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality,
however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding
subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a
quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects
but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities
were thus called gunas probably to suggest that they are the
entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves
as gunas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be
called gunas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes
by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and
matter. These may also be called gunas as things of secondary
importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they
continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual
groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably
constant like the souls (_purusa_). Moreover the object of the
world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the purusas,
the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of
primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined
to justify the name guna as applied to these subtle entities, it
should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or
subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gunas are
infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics
as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types
called _sattva_ (intelligence-stuff), _rajas_ (energy-stuff) and _tamas_
(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in
certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the
_sattva-gunas_ and those which behave as units of activity are called
the _rajo-gunas_ and those which behave as factors of obstruction,
mass or materiality are called _tamo-gunas_. These subtle guna
substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number
of sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a
larger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and
sattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result
of this, different substances with different qualities come into being.
Though attached to one another when united in different proportions,
they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined
resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is
however
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one and only one stage in which the gunas are not compounded
in varying proportions. In this state each of the guna
substances is opposed by each of the other guna substances, and
thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in
which none of the characters of the gunas manifest themselves.
This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics
that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It
is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which
is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium
of the gunas is called prakrti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which
cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose,
but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the
earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications
take place.
Prakrti and its Evolution.
Sâmkhya believes that before this world came into being there
was such a state of dissolution--a state in which the guna compounds
had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their
mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakrti. Then
later on disturbance arose in the prakrti, and as a result of that a
process of unequal aggregation of the gunas in varying proportions
took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold.
Prakrti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the
gunas, thus gradually evolved and became more | |
